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Carter: Carter: Bifurcations of Consciousness:

Bifurcations of Consciousness: The
Elimination of the Self-induced
Intoxication Excuse
DerrickAugustus Carter
I. INTRODUCTION
In early American and English common law, intoxication evidence did not
excuse or mitigate criminal behavior.! Any person who destroyed his or her
volition through intoxication was equally as culpable as a sober person for the
legal consequences of a self-induced vice. 2 Voluntary drunkenness aggravated,
rather than reduced, criminal liability.3

* Associate Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law, Indiana.
Formerly of the Michigan Appellate Defender Office, a division of the Michigan
Supreme Court. I wish to thank Ruth Buckler for her encouragement and advice. I also
wish to thank Shirley Mason-Carter and Ken Carter, posthumously, who inspired me to
write this Article. Finally, I wish to thank Professor Ivan Bodensteiner and Professor
JoEllen Lind for their editorial assistance.
1. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996). In Egelhoff, Justice Scalia
commented:
Drunkenness, it was said in an early case, can never be received as a ground
to excuse or palliate an offence: this is not merely the opinion of a
speculative philosopher, the argument of counsel, or the obiter dictum of a
single judge, but it is a sound and long established maxim ofjudicial policy,
from which perhaps a single dissenting voice cannot be found.
Id. at 44 (quoting 1 M. HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 32-33 n.3 (1736)).
See generally RIU. Singh, History of the Defence ofDrunkenness in English Criminal
Law, 49 LAw Q. REv. 528 (1933).
2. See Director of Public Prosecutions v. Beard, 1920 App. Cas. 479. In Beard,
Lord Birkenhead observed:
Under the law of England as it prevailed until early in the nineteenth century
voluntary drunkenness was never an excuse for criminal misconduct; and
indeed the classic authorities broadly assert that voluntary drunkenness must
be considered rather an aggravation than a defence.... A man who by his
own voluntary act debauches and destroys his will power shall be no better
situated in regard to criminal acts than a sober man.
Id. at 494. See also California v. Whitfield, 868 P.2d 272, 290-93 (Cal. 1994) (Mosk,
J., dissenting) (discussing the English and American history of intoxication).
3. United States v. Comell, 25 F. Cas. 650, 658 (C.C.D.R.I. 1820) (No. 14,868)
("Drunkenness is a gross vice, and in the contemplation of some of our laws is a crime;
and I learned in my earlier studies, that so far from its being in law an excuse for murder,
it is rather an aggravation of its malignity."); New York v. Register, 457 N.E.2d 704
(N.Y. 1983), cert. denied,466 U.S. 953 (1984). In Register,the court observed:
The common law courts viewed the decision to drink to excess, with its
attendant risks to self and others, as an independent culpable act ....
In
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As time evolved, changing societal attitudes on drinking eased the strict ban
against the intoxication defense.4 Many judges recognized that the debilitating
impact of excessive alcohol warranted admission of intoxication evidence to
negate proof that the accused was physically and mentally capable of committing
the crime.' A few judges permitted the intoxication defense to negate proof of
specific intent crimes, such as first degree murder, but continued to ban the
intoxication defense to general intent crimes, such as rape.6 Today, the vast
majority of states adhere to the specific-general intent formula in determining the
admissibility of the intoxication defense
A growing number of states,8 however, are resurrecting the common law
rule that bans the intoxication excuse to all crimes because of a renewed
appreciation that self-induced intoxication is preventable and is a substantial
cause of many crimes. 9 Studies confirm that inebriation is involved in fifty

utilitarian terms, the risk of excessive drinking should be added to and not

subtracted from the risks created by the conduct of the drunken defendant for
there is no social or penological purpose to be served by a rule that permits
one who voluntarily drinks to be exonerated from failing to foresee the results
of his conduct if he is successful at getting drunk.
Id. at 709. See Pigman v. Ohio, 14 Ohio 555, 557 (1846) ("The older writers regarded
drunkenness as an aggravation of the offense, and excluded it for any purpose.").
4. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 46; see also DR. JOEL FORT, ALCOHOL: OUR BIGGEST
DRUG PROBLEM 49 (1973). In chapter 3, History ofAlcohol, Dr. Fort observed:
While the early Americans were attempting to control the abuse of alcohol,
laws were passed to increase the production of wine and spirits. The Puritans
urged temperance, but not abstinence. In Massachusetts Bay Colony, brewing
was the third most important industry; drunkenness was punished by
whipping, fines, or the stocks. Thus, the tradition of totally opposite policies,
of the right hand operating at cross purposes with the left, began very early
in America.
Id.
5. Register,457 N.E.2d at 709.
6. See Note, Intoxication as a CriminalDefense, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 1210, 1211
(1955).

7. See infra note 115 and accompanying text (describing the specific-general intent
test).
8. 17 states joined in an Amicus Brief to Montanav. Egelhoff,518 U.S. 37 (1996),
in support of a states' right to ban the intoxication excuse: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
Delaware, Hawaii, Kansas, Ohio, Oklahoma, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Mexico, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, and West Virginia.
9. Some of the other state legislatures have eliminated voluntary intoxication as a
defense to criminal conduct and have made evidence of voluntary intoxication irrelevant
for purposes of establishing the accused's mental state. See Arizona v. Ramos, 648 P.2d
119, 121 (Ariz. 1982) ("Perhaps the state of mind which needs to be proven here is a
watered down mens rea; however, this is the prerogative of the legislature.") (interpreting
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-503 (1989)); White v. Arkansas, 717 S.W.2d 784 (Ark.
1986) (interpreting ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-207 (Michie 1987)); Wyant v. Delaware, 519
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss2/3
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percent of homicides," sixty-two percent of aggravated assaults, and fifty
percent of spousal abuses, rapes, and property offenses." In addition to the
correlation with violence, intoxication contributes to forty percent of automobile
fatalities. 2

A.2d 649 (Del. 1986) (interpreting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 421 (1995)); Foster v.
Georgia, 374 S.E.2d 188, 194-95, 196 (Ga. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1085 (1989)
("[T]he law ... excuses the young and the insane, out of tenderness towards an infirmity
which is involuntary... [but] the law takes special care to exclude drunken men from
the excuse, because their infirmity is voluntary.") (interpreting GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-4
(1998)); Hawaii v. Souza, 813 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Haw. 1991) (stating that the "legislature
was entitled to redefine the mens rea element of crimes and to exclude evidence of
voluntary intoxication to negate state of mind") (interpreting HAw. REV. STAT. § 702-230
(1993)); Lanier v. Mississippi, 533 So. 2d 473 (Miss. 1988); Missouri v. Erwin, 848
S.W.2d 476 (Mo. 1983), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 826 (1994) (interpreting Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 562.076 (1994)); Commonwealth v. Rumsey, 454 A.2d 1121, 1122 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1983) (stating that the legislative prerogative in defining mens rea is "constantly shifting
adjustment between the evolving aims of the criminal law and changing religious, moral,
philosophical, and medical views of the nature of man") (interpreting 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 308 (Purdon 1998)); South Carolina v. Vaughn, 232 S.E.2d 328 (S.C.
1977); Hawkins v. Texas, 605 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (interpreting TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.04 (Vernon 1994)).
10. Note, AlcoholAbuse andtheLaw,94 HARV. L. REV. 1660, 1682 (1981) (citing
Goodwin, Alcohol in Suicide and Homicide, 34 Q.J. STUD. ALCOHOL 144, 154 (1973)).
11. See Robert A. Moore, LegalResponsibility and ChronicAlcoholism, 122 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 748 (1966). Moore commented:
To demonstrate that the association of crime and alcohol is not insignificant,
a sampling of a few statistics is enlightening. Of 882 felons arrested in a two
year period in Cincinnati, 64% had a urine alcohol level of .10 percent or
higher. In crimes of violence, the incidence varied from 67-88%. A four year
study of 588 homicide cases in Philadelphia revealed that one or both parties
had been drinking in 64 % of the cases .... In Cincinnati, 84 percent of 225
homicide victims had been drinking, and 44 percent had a blood alcohol level
of .15 percent or higher ....
This is not an American phenomenon. In Yugoslavia, 60 to 80 percent
of all crimes involve intoxication to some degree, with over half of the
homicides committed during a state of pathological intoxication. The
association of alcohol and crime was lower but not insignificant in Sweden:
39 percent of male offenders but only 4.2 percent of women offenders were
intoxicated at the time of the offense. In Japan, it was found that 36 percent
of arsonists, 27 percent of murders and 18 percent of assaulters had been
intoxicated at the time of the crime, and 17.6 percent of all prisoners were
intoxicated offenders.
Id. at 753.
12. According to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,
approximately 40% to 50% of traffic fatalities are attributed to intoxication from 1988
to 1995. USA TODAY, May 23, 1997, at 4-A Alcohol-related traffic fatalities as a
percentage of the total:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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Intoxication releases inhibitions, impairs judgement, incites hostile
behavior, and unleashes one's criminal impulses. 13 Intoxication is defined as a
"disturbance of mental or physical capacities resulting from the introduction of
substances into the body.'

14

The level required for intoxicated driving

convictions varies from state to state, but most states recognize .10 percent
blood-alcohol content as definitive evidence of drunk driving. 5

Total
Fatalities

Alcohol
Related
Fatalities

%Fatalities
Alcohol
Related

1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

43,945
42,589
44,257
43,825
46,087
46,390
47,087
45,582
44,599
41,508

25,165
23,646
23,798
22,716
24,046
23,641
23,626
22,404
22,084
19,887

57.3%
55.5%
53.7%
51.8%
52.2%
51.0%
50.2%
49.2%
49.2%
47.9%

1992

39,250

17,858

45.5%

1993
1994
1995
1996*
1997*

40,150
40,716
41,798
42,065
42,000

17,473
16,580
17,274

43.5%
40.7%
41.3%

16,520

* Ezio C. CERELLI, 1997 TRAFFIC CRASHES, INJURIES, AND FATALITIES - PRELIMINARY

REPORT, at 1-2, 20; see also EIGHTH SPECIAL REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS

ON ALCOHOL AND HEALTH 238 (1993).
13. See Monrad G. Paulsen, Intoxication as a Defense to Crime, 1961 U. ILL. L.F.
1, 1 (drinking intoxicants stimulates by "loosening the brakes, not stepping on the gas").
Each intoxicated individual will be governed by his underlying instincts, the
personality pattern which emerges when he is under alcoholic influence is
likely to be repeated each time he is in a similar condition. Furthermore,
nearly all drunken offenders intend their criminal acts in a manner similar to
sober men. Thus under alcoholic influence the person's intent remains
unchanged; only the inhibitory influences normally restraining him are
removed.
Id. See Note, Intoxicationas a CriminalDefense, supra note 6, at 1211; see also Note,
AlcoholAbuse and the Law, supra note 10, at 1682 ("Alcohol reduces one's sensitivity
to external cues to behavior and dulls self-control and self-criticism.").
14. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(5)(a) (1962). The definition of intoxication is not
limited to alcohol but is sufficiently broad to include other personality altering
substances, e.g., marijuana, LSD, cocaine, heroin, etc. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. 45-2101 (1997).
15. See FORT, supra note 4, at 29. Dr. Fort estimates that .10 is about four drinks
within an hour, which may vary with body weight, tolerance, and digestion. See FORT,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss2/3
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In response to the harm caused by self-induced intoxication, the State of
Montana passed a statute stating that "[a] person who is in an intoxicated
condition is criminally responsible for his conduct and an intoxicated condition
is not a defense to any offense and may not be taken into consideration in
determining the existence of a mental state which is an element of the offense
.... ,,6 Banning this material defense, however, presented challenges, such as
the due process right to present a defense, the due process right to present
relevant evidence, and the constitutional propriety of reducing the prosecution's
burden of proof. The United States Supreme Court addressed these challenges
in Montana v. Egelhoff.7
This Article examines the Egelhoff case as a stage to review national
policies addressing the intoxication excuse. While the Egelhoff decision has
little bearing on the majority of states, which adhere to the specific-general intent
formula, many prosecutors and jurists are dissatisfied with the incongruous
results of the specific intent test and with current lenient legislation concerning
intoxication. Many states find Montana's ban on the intoxication excuse very
attractive. 8 Other states are subjecting repeated drunken offenders who cause
death to first and second degree murder prosecutions.19 These recent advances
in the movement against the intoxication excuse stem from a renewed
appreciation of the principles of causation and personal accountability. Abusive
drinking prophetically causes foreseeable and harmful results.
When
intoxication evidence is filtered through principles of causation, Montana's

supra note 4, at 29. At .10, there is some significant impairment of judgment, muscle
coordination and vision. Reaction time is slowed. See FORT, supra note 4, at 28.
"The National Highway Safety Administration has determined that a typical 170pound man has to consume more than four drinks on an empty stomach in one hour to
exceed .08." Michael Massing, rhy Beer Won't Go Up in Smoke, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
March 22, 1998, § 6, at 48. Many states are reducing the required level of intoxication
to .08. John Gibeaut, Sobering Thoughts, Legislaturesand Courts Increasinglyare Just
Saying No to Intoxication as a Defense or MitigatingFactor, 83 A.B.A. J. 56, 62 (1997).
16. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-203 (1997). The entire statute reads:
A person who is in an intoxicated condition is criminally responsible for his
conduct and an intoxicated condition is not a defense to any offense and may
not be taken into consideration in determining the existence of a mental state
which is an element of the offense unless the defendant proves that he did not
know that it was an intoxicating substance when he consumed, smoked,
injected, or otherwise ingested the substance causing the condition.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-203 (1997).
17. 518 U.S. 37 (1996).
18. See Gibeaut, supra note 15, at 58-59.
19. See United States v. Fleming, 739 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that
extreme reckless drunk driving offense could be prosecuted as second degree murder),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1193 (1985); California v. Whitfield, 868 P.2d 272 (Cal. 1994)
(affirming a second degree murder conviction for an intoxicated driving offense); New
York v. Register, 457 N.E.2d 704, 709 (N.Y. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 953 (1984).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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approach of eliminating intoxication as an excuse for crime "has considerable
justification." 20
Part H1 of this Article first examines the factual and legal development of the
Egelhoffcase through the Montana Supreme Court and then assesses the United
States Supreme Court's decision upholding Montana's intoxication ban.2 The
Egelhoff case demonstrates that fundamental due process defenses must be
examined through the lenses of history and tradition. Part Ill examines the
specific-generalintent formula that determines the admissibility of intoxication
evidence in the majority of states. Part W explores new legislative and
prosecutorial approaches towards the intoxication defense and suggests defense
strategies. Part V examines the principle of causation,which is the driving force
behind society's renewed intolerance of repeated intoxicated behavior that
causes harm and death. Part VI concludes with a discussion of the societal
ramifications of eliminating the intoxication excuse.22

20. Egelhoff,518 U.S. at 49.
21. This Article focuses on alcoholic, as opposed to drug, intoxication. While there
is considerable overlap between alcoholic intoxication and drug intoxication, there are
significant differences. Most drug use, unless prescribed, is illegal and witnesses are
frequently scarce. The effects of alcohol intoxication are well-established, while the
effects of drugs are still widely disputed. Ordinarily, the use of alcohol produces no
mental illness except by long continued excessive use. On the other hand, the same
result can be obtained overnight by the use of modem hallucinary drugs like LSD. See
generally Phillip E. Hassman, Annotation, Effect of VoluntaryDrug Intoxication Upon
Criminal Responsibility, 73 A.L.R.3d 98, 129-38 (1977 & Supp. 1996) [hereinafter
Hassman, VoluntaryDrugIntoxication];Phillip E. Hassman, Annotation, DrugAddiction
orRelated Mental State as Defense to CriminalCharge,73 A.L.R.3d 16 (1977 & Supp.
1996) [hereinafter Hassman, DrugAddiction as Defense]; G. Lunter, The Effect ofDrug
Induced Intoxication on the Issue of CriminalResponsibility, 8 CRiM. L. BULL. 731
(1972). In Iowa v. Hall, 214 N.W.2d 205 (Iowa 1974), Judge LeGrand noted:
We do not yet have the same scientific reliability on the effect of the use of
drugs as far as criminal responsibility is concerned. But this should not tempt
us to slough the matter off by lumping all drugs together with alcohol, where
obviously many of them do not belong.
Id. at 213 (LeGrand, J., dissenting).
22. Habitual use of intoxicants can result in permanent mental disorder that remains
even when the person is not under the influence of intoxicants. If the unsoundness of
mind produced by long-term alcohol or drug abuse has become fixed or settled, the
nearly universal rule is that the defendant may assert a traditional insanity defense. See
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 24.05, at 283-84 (2d ed. 1995).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss2/3
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II. MONTANA V. EGELHOFF

A. FactualBackground
James Egelhoff was accused of shooting two people to death near Troy,
Montana. The evidence at trial revealed that Egelhoff accompanied John
Christianson and Roberta Payola throughout the evening of July 12, 1992 to
various parties and bars.23 Several witnesses testified at trial that they saw
Egelhoff in John Christianson's station wagon, which was later discovered
disabled in a ditch. 4 Several witnesses testified that they attempted to rescue
those in the disabled car, but they were frightened away by Egelhoff, who

shouted profanities and threats from the backseat of the station wagon.' Several
witnesses testified that they saw two bodies "slumped over" in the front seat of
the car.2 6 The police discovered the bodies of John Christianson, shot in the back

of the head, and Roberta Payola, shot in the left temple, in the front seat of the
station wagon. The police found James Egelhoff in the rear passenger
compartment yelling obscenities. 27 Egelhoff's tennis shoe and gun were found
on the front floor near the brake pedal.28
Upon arrest, Egelhoff attacked the police'and ambulance attendants. The
police physically restrained Egelhoff for six hours at the hospital. 29 The state's
forensic pathologist testified that Egelhoff's blood-alcohol content was .36
percent, a near lethal dose. 3' Forensics testing identified gunshot residue on
Egelhoff's hands.3' Testimony by the state firearms examiner indicated that the
bullet which killed Christianson originated from a gun with similar
characteristics as Egelhoff's gun.32 Blood stains found on Egelhoff's pants and
T-shirt were consistent with Christianson's and Pavola's blood.33
James Egelhoff testified that he was so drunk he could remember very few
details of the evening of July 12th. He did not remember the shooting, the
parties, the ambulance attendants, or kicking the camera from the police

23. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 40 (1996).
24. Id.

25. Montana v. Egelhoff, 900 P.2d 260, 262 (Mont. 1995).
26. Brief for Petitioner at *7,Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996) (No. 95566), availablein 1996 WL 19035.
27. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 40.
28. Id.
29. Egelhoff 900 P.2d at 262.

30. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 40 (1996).
31. Id.

32. Montana v. Egelhoff, 900 P.2d 260, 262 (Mont. 1995).
33. Brief for Petitioner at *9,Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996) (No. 95566), availablein 1996 WL 19035.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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photographer.34 Egelhoff testified that he last remembered sitting on a hill
passing a bottle of "Black Velvet" to John Christianson.35 The defense
contended that Egelhoff s intoxication level precluded Egelhoff from
undertaking the physical tasks necessary to accomplish the murder.36 Egelhoff
denied committing the murders and blamed them on an unknown person.37
At the conclusion of trial, the judge instructed the jury regarding Montana's
statutory definition of a purposeful, knowing, and deliberate killing:
A person acts purposely when it is his conscious object to engage in
conduct of that nature or to cause such a result. A person acts
knowingly when he is aware of his conduct or when he is aware under
the circumstances his conduct constitutes a crime; or when he is aware
that there exists the high probability that his conduct will cause a
specific result.38
The trial judge also instructed the jury, over defense objection, that

34. Egelhoff, 900 P.2d at 262.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 263.
38. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102(l)(a) (1997), provides: "A person commits the
offense of deliberate homicide if: (a) he purposely or knowingly causes the death of
another human being.... ." Section 45-2-101(34) defines "knowingly" as follows:
[A] person acts knowingly with respect to conduct or to a circumstance
described by a statute defining an offense when the person is aware of the
person's own conduct or that the circumstance exists. A person acts
knowingly with respect to the result of conduct described by a statute defining
an offense when the person is aware that it is highly probable that the result
will be caused by the person's conduct. When knowledge of the existence of
a particular fact is an element of an offense, knowledge is established if a
person is aware of a high probability of its existence. Equivalent terms, such
as "knowing" or "with knowledge," have the same meaning.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(34) (1997). Section 45-2-101(63) defines "purposely"

as follows:
[A] person acts purposely with respect to a result or to conduct described by
a statute defining an offense if it is the person's conscious object to engage
in that conduct or to cause that result. When a particular purpose is an
element of an offense, the element is established although the purpose is
conditional, unless the condition negatives the harm or evil sought to be
prevented by the law defining the offense. Equivalent terms, such as
"purpose" and "with the purpose," have the same meaning.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101 (63) (1997). A deliberate murder in Montana is
punishable by death, or life imprisonment, or by a term of not less than ten or more than
100 years. See MONT. CODEANN. § 45-5-102(2) (1997).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss2/3
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voluntary intoxication is not a defense to the killing and is irrelevant to the
existence of Egelhoff's mental state:
A person who is in an intoxicated condition is criminally responsible
for his conduct and an intoxicatedcondition is not a defense to any
offense and may not be taken into considerationin determining the
existence of a mental state which is an element of the offense unless
the Defendant proves that he did not know that it was an intoxicating
substance when he consumed the substance causing the condition.39
The jury found James Egelhoff guilty of two counts of deliberate homicide.
The judge sentenced Egelhoff to serve two consecutive terms of forty years in
prison, plus two consecutive terms of two years in prison for possession of the
gun, for a total of eighty-four years imprisonment.40 James Egelhoff then
appealed to the Montana Supreme Court.
B. The MontanaSupreme Court
The Montana Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Weber,
unanimously reversed James Egelhoff's conviction and held that "Egelhoff was
denied due process when the jury was instructed that voluntary intoxication may
not be taken into consideration in determining the existence of a mental state
which is an element of the offense. ' 41 The court recognized that a purposeful
and knowing killing results from a subjective mental state and intoxication
evidence is relevant to that subjective mental state. The court stressed that it
would be fundamentally unfair to permit the State to offer evidence in support
of a purposeful and knowing killing without permitting the jury to consider the
evidence that cast doubt upon Egelhoffrs mental state.42
Moreover, the intoxication instruction invaded the jury's province:
By instructingthejury that it may not consider intoxication evidence
for purposes of determining a mental state of "knowingly" or
"'purposely," the jury may be misled into believing the State has
proved the mental state beyond a reasonabledoubt and that is why
defendant cannot introduce evidence in opposition to a specific state
39. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-203 (1997) (emphasis added).
40. Montana v. Egelhoff, 900 P.2d 260, 261 (Mont. 1995).
41. Egelhoff,900 P.2d at 266-67 (holding that the decision applies retroactively to
those cases pending on direct appellate review, but not to those on collateral review).
42. Id. at 265. In Egelhoff,the evidence was presented by the State to establish that
Egelhoff acted "purposely" or "knowingly." Such evidence could be properly considered
by the jury in its determination of whether or not he acted "purposely" or "knowingly."
However, Egelhoff was not allowed to rebut such evidence with evidence that his level
of intoxication precluded him from forming the requisite mental state. Id. at 266.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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of mind. The state should never escape its burden of proof of each
element of the offense.43
The Montana Supreme Court noted that the burden of proofwas not shifted;
rather, it was reduced improperly:
Egelhoff was not allowed to rebut such evidence with evidence
that his level of intoxication precluded him from forming the requisite
mental state. As a result of the elimination of the opportunity of using
this rebuttal evidence, the prosecution's burden of proof for the
element of mental state was reduced.
This is a denial of due process. Due process is "the right to a fair
opportunity to defend against the State's accusations." This right to
present a defense is fundamental."
The Montana Supreme Court relied on several prior holdings of the United

States Supreme Court: In Re Winship,45 Martin v. Ohio,46 Sandstrom v.
Montana,47 and Chambersv. Mississippi.8 The Montana court recognized that

the United States Supreme Court's collective holdings emphasized the strict
burden placed on the prosecution to prove every element, especially intent,
beyond a reasonable doubt.49 In Re Winship emphasizes that "the reasonable

doubt standard is indispensable, for it 'impresses on the trier of fact the necessity
of reaching a subjective state of certitude of the facts in issue.' 50 In Martin v.

43. Id. at266.
44. Id. at 265 (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973)). The
court also noted:
While Egelhoff was given the opportunity to present evidence of his level of
intoxication, the instruction prevented consideration by the jury as it decided
whether or not there was a reasonable doubt as to Egelhoff's acting
"knowingly" and "purposely." Because the jury was not allowed to consider
that evidence for such a purpose, the State was relieved of part of its burden
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the
crime charged. It was reversible error to instruct the jury not to consider it.
Id. at 266.
45. 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that the State must prove every element of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt).
46. 480 U.S. 228 (1987) (holding that it was proper to place the burden of proof
on the accused to prove self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence, but
emphasizing in dicta that eliminating intoxication altogether would violate due process).
47. 442 U.S. 510 (1979) (holding that ajury instruction [on presumptions], which
shifts the burden of proof on the accused's mental state is unconstitutional).
48. 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (holding that the right to present a defense is
fundamental).
49. Montana v. Egelhoff, 900 P.2d 260,264-66 (Mont. 1995).
50. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). See also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421
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Ohio,"'the United States Supreme Court emphasized that eliminating the selfdefense claim would improperly "relieve the State of its burden and plainly run
afoul of [In re] Winship's mandate." 2
In deciding Egelhoff,the Montana Supreme Court diligently abided by the
spirit of these prior holdings;53 especially to a prior reversal in the landmark
decision of Sandstrom v. Montana, 4 which reiterated the fundamental precept
that jury instructions which shift the burden of proof of the accused's mental
state are unconstitutional. Nonetheless, the Montana prosecutor appealed to the
United States Supreme Court,55 which reversed by a 5-4 plurality decision,
holding that the Montana legislature could ban the intoxication defense. 6 The

plurality, inan opinion by Justice Scalia, handily disposed of the constitutional
issues concerning burden of proof, relevance, and the admissibility of the
intoxication defense. 7

U.S. 684, 700 (1975) ("It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted
by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being
condemned.") (emphasis added).
51. 480 U.S. 228, 233-34 (1987).

52. Id.
53. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37,61 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("Ifthe
Montana Court considered its analysis forced by this Court's precedent, it is proper for
[the United States Supreme Court] to say what prescriptions federal law leaves to the
States, and thereby dispel confusion to which we may have contributed, and attendant
state-court misperception.").
54. 442 U.S. 510, 520 (1979) (holding that an aged old instruction that "the law
presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts" is
unconstitutional). The Court held that a reasonable juror possibly understood the
instruction to create either a conclusive or burden shiffing presumption that defendant
possessed the necessary mental state. Id. "Lest there remain any doubt about the
constitutional stature of the reasonable doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due
Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he charged."
Id.
55. Jurisdiction was invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (1994) ("Final Judgments
or decrees rendered by the highest Court of the State... may be reviewed by the

Supreme Court ....
).
56. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996).
57. The United States Supreme Court wrote a splintered opinion. Justice Scalia

wrote a four-Justice plurality opinion. Justice Ginsburg concurred in the judgment.
Justice O'Connor wrote a four-Justice dissent, although Justice Souter also wrote a
separate dissent, as did Justice Breyer with whom Justice Stevens joined.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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C. The United States Supreme Court
1. Burden of Proof
Justice Scalia declared that eliminating the intoxication defense does not
shift the burden of proof because the accused bears no burden in showing
intoxication. 8 Instead, eliminating the intoxication defense has the practical
effect of "burden reducing" by making it easier for the government to prove its
case of a purposeful and knowing killing:
"Reducing" the State's burden in this manner is not unconstitutional,

unless the rule of evidence violates a fundamental principle of
fairness. We have "rejected the view that anything in the Due Process
Clause bars States from making changes in their criminal law that
have the effect of making it easier for the prosecution to obtain
convictions. 59
According to Justice Scalia, the prosecution satisfied its burden ofproof by
presenting "considerable evidence" from which the jury could have concluded
that James Egelhoff acted "purposely" and "knowingly"; specifically, the jury
considered the execution style manner of the killing, Egelhoff's aggressiveness
and coordination, and the forensics evidence.6"
Any evidentiary rule, according to Justice Scalia, can have the effect of
reducing the prosecution's burden of proof.6' "Reducing the state's burden in
this manner is not unconstitutional unless the rule of evidence itself violates a
fundamental principle of fairness. 62 To determine fundamental fairness, one
examines the tradition and history of the defense. History reveals that
intoxication was not a cognizable defense at common law.6'
Justice Scalia distinguished Martin v. Ohio,' where the Court previously
disapproved of eliminating self-defense, by explaining that self-defense may be
a "fundamental [defense], a proposition that the historical record may support." 65
Also, Justice Scalia explained in a footnote that the Court's suggestions in

58. Egelhoff,518 U.S. at 54 ("These decisions [Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S.
510 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)] simply are not implicated here because,
as the Montana court itself recognized, 'the burden is not shifted."').
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. See also Arizona v. Ramos, 648 P.2d 119 (Ariz. 1982) (holding that "a
watered down mens rea" is the prerogative of the legislature) (citing Powell v. Texas, 392
U.S. 514, 535 (1968)).
62. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 54 (1996).
63. See supranote 1 and accompanying text.
64. 480 U.S. 228 (1987).
65. Egelhoff,518 U.S. at 55.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss2/3
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Martin are primarily dicta: "[i]t is to the holdings of our cases, rather than their
dicta, that we must attend."'
Another case, not cited by Justice Scalia, foreshadowed Egelhoffs
conclusion that the accused has no constitutional right to introduce evidence of
his intoxication. In Fisherv. United States,67 the Supreme Court rejected the
accused's claim that he had a constitutional right to present evidence of his
mental disorder, which was short of insanity, in determining premeditation and
deliberation.
[T]here was sufficient evidence to support a verdict of murder in the
first degree, if petitioner was a normal man in his mental and
emotional characteristics. But the defense takes the position that the
petitioner is fairly entitled to be judged as to deliberation and
premedication, not by a theoretical normality but by his own personal
traits. In view of the status of the defense of partial responsibility in
the District and the nation
no contention is or could be made of the
68
denial of due process.
"If the accused had no constitutional right to introduce evidence of a
personal condition for which he was not responsible, then the accused has no
right to introduce
evidence of a condition which his own blameworthy conduct
'69
created. ,
2. Relevance
Intoxication, the Court admitted, is relevant to intent, purpose, and
knowledge. 7' However, the state legislature determines the limits as to
relevancy. 7' In Montana, as in most states, evidence is considered "relevant" if
it makes a fact more or less probable.72 State evidentiary rules bar relevant

66. Id. The Court added: "Ifthe Martin dictum means that the Due Process Clause
requires all relevant evidence bearing on the elements of a crime to be admissible, the
decisions we have discussed show it to be incorrect." Id.
67. 328 U.S. 463 (1946).
68. Id. at466.
69. Mitchell Keiter, Just Say No Excuse: The Rise andFall of the Intoxication
Defense, 87 J. CIUM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 482, 504 (1997).
70. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37,42 (1996).
71. Id. ("Relevant evidence may, for example be excluded on account of a
defendant's failure to comply with procedural requirements.... And any number of
familiar and unquestionably constitutional evidentiary rules also authorize the exclusion
of relevant evidence.").
72. MONT. R. EVID. 401.
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evidence that is incompetent, privileged, or misleading,73 such as hearsay
evidence, which is frequently unreliable.74
Justice O'Connor, who led the dissent, agreed that "a defendant does not
enjoy an absolute right to present evidence relevant to his defense";75 however,
she contended that Montana's rule "places a blanket exclusion on a category of
evidence that would allow the accused to negate the offense's mental state
element. ' 76 Justice O'Connor distinguished hearsay, which is a category of
unreliable evidence, from intoxication, which is a category of highly reliable
evidence directly related to guilt or innocence.77 Justice O'Connor also
emphasized that the accused has constitutional safeguards, such as the
79 right to
compulsory process78 and the right to present exculpatory evidence:
Due process demands that a criminal defendant be afforded a fair
opportunity to defend against the State's accusations. Meaningful
adversarial testing of the State's case requires that the defendant not
be prevented from raising an effective defense, which must include the
right to present relevant, probative evidence.8
In response, Justice Scalia noted in a footnote that

73. MONT. R. EVID. 401.
74. MONT. R. EVlD.403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded

if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
75. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 62 (O'Conner, J., dissenting).
76. Id.
77. Id. Justice O'Connor stated:
It is true that a defendant does not enjoy an absolute right to present evidence
relevant to his defense .... But none of the "familiar" evidentiary rules
operates as Montana's does. The Montana statute places a blanket exclusion
on a category of evidence that would allow the accused to negate the
offenses's mental state element. In so doing, it frees the prosecution, in the
face of such evidence, from having to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant nevertheless possessed the required mental state.

Id.
78. Id. at 63 (asserting that "the Constitution prohibited a State from establishing
rules to prevent whole categories of defense witnesses from testifying out of a belief that
such witnesses were untrustworthy. Such action by the State detracted too severely and
arbitrarily from the defendant's right to call witnesses in his favor") (citing Washington
v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967)).
79. Id. (asserting that the "limitations on evidence may exceed the bounds of due
process where such limitations undermine a defendant's ability to present exculpatory
evidence without serving a valid state justification") (citing Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
683 (1986)).

80. Id.
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so long as the category of excluded evidence is selected on a basis that
has good and traditional policy support, it ought to be valid. We do
not entirely understand Justice O'Connor's argument that the vice of
Sec. 45-2-203 [eliminating intoxication] is that it excludes evidence
"essential to the accused's defense." Evidence of intoxication is not
always "essential" any more than hearsay evidence is always
"nonessential.""1
2
Justice Scalia conceded that the Court's prior holding in Crane v. Kentucky
recognized that the defense has an opportunity to present reliable evidence that
is central to the accused's claim of innocence.
But Crane also "makes
perfectly clear that we were not setting forth an absolute entitlement to introduce
crucial, relevant evidence."' In the absence of state legislation banning the
defense, the exclusion of intoxication evidence might deprive a defendant of
basic due process rights," but the state legislature may limit the introduction of
relevant evidence for "valid" reasons.86

"Among other things, it is normally 'within the power ofthe State to
regulate procedures under which its laws are carried out,'... and its
decision in this regard is not subject to proscription under the Due
Process Clause unless 'it offends some principle ofjustice so rooted
in the traditions87 and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental."'
Justice Scalia recognized that the Montana legislature should have
discretion on empirically relevant matters such as intoxication:

81. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37,43 n.1 (1996). This is a good point because
most states recognize that intoxication is no defense to general intent crimes. There are
many instances when intoxication evidence is not essential. See supra notes 6-7 and
accompanying text.
82. 476 U.S. 683 (1986).
83. Id. at 690.
84. Egelhoff,518 U.S. at 53 ("Cranedoes nothing to undermine the principle that
the introduction of relevant evidence can be limited by the state for a valid reason.").
85. See Hopt v. People, 104 U.S. 631 (1881) (holding that evidence of intoxication
is material to a defense to first degree murder). The Court stated:
The condition of the defendant's mind at the time the act was committed must
be inquired after, in order to justly determine the question as to whether his
mind was capable of that deliberation or premeditation which, according as
they are absent or present, determine the degree of the crime.
Id. at 633.
86. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37,43 (1996).
87. Id.(quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977)).
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There is, in modem times, even more justification for laws such as
Sec. 45-2-203 [eliminating intoxication] than there used to be. Some
recent studies suggest that the connection between drunkenness and
crime is as much cultural as pharmacological that is, that drunks are
violent not simply because alcohol makes them that way, but because
they are behaving in accord with their learned belief that drunks are
violent. This not only adds additional support to the traditional view
that an intoxicated criminal is not deserving of exoneration, but it
suggests that juries who possess the same learned belief as the
intoxicated offender will be too quick to accept the claim that the
defendant was biologically incapable offorming the requisite mens
rea. Treating the matter as one of excluding misleading evidence
therefore makes some sense.88
"In light of intoxication's questionable relevance, its limited helpfulness,
and the potential for its fraudulent use, Montana's exclusion of intoxication may
actually promote a primary goal of criminal justice-accurate factfinding."89
3. Elimination of a Defense
Justice Scalia recognized that, as a general proposition, the legislature
specifies the applicable defenses. Eliminating a defense, however, conflicts with
the accused's reciprocal rights of cross-examination, compulsory process, and
jury determination of all the elements to an offense. 90 The legislature, according
to the Supreme Court, may eliminate a defense unless the ban violates a
"fundamental principle ofjustice."' One of the Court's established methods of
due process analysis in determining "fundamental principles" is to consider
whether the principle is deeply rooted in history and tradition.92 At early
common law, intoxication did not excuse a crime; it aggravated a persons'
culpability. 93
Justice Scalia noted that at common law the intoxicated defendant had no
special privilege based on self-contracted madness. 94 "Drunkenness, it was said

88. Id. at 51 (emphasis added).
89. Brief of the American Alliance for Rights and Responsibilities and the New
York Chapter of Parents of Murdered Children as Amicus Curiae for Petitioner at *27,
Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996) (No. 95-566), available in 1996 WL 17146.
90. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 62 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at43.
92. Id. at 44. See also Hawaii v. Souza, 813 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Haw. 1991)
(holding that voluntary intoxication is a gratuitous defense and not a constitutionally
protected defense to criminal conduct).
93. See supranotes 1-5 and accompanying text.
94. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37,45 (1996). See also Francis Bowes Sayre,
Mens Rea, 45 HARv. L. REV. 974, 1014 (1932) ("It is only within fairly modem times,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss2/3
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in an early case, can never be received as a ground to excuse or palliate an
offence: this is not merely the opinion of a speculative philosopher, the
argument of counsel, or the obiter dictum of a single judge, but it is a sound and
long established maxim of judicial policy, from which perhaps a single
dissenting voice cannot be found." 95 The common law view was based on the

Aristotlean notion that "two antisocial acts were committed: getting drunk and
causing the harm to others.

96

Nor, at common law, could intoxication excuse mens rea.97 "It is
inconceivable," according to Justice Scalia, "that the legal commentators did not
realize that an offender's drunkenness might impair his ability to form the
requisite intent; and inconceivable that their failure to note intoxication's
exception from the general rule was an oversight."98 The historical reasons
advanced in support of the rule eliminating intoxication as an affirmative defense
or as an excuse to mens rea include the ease of counterfeiting the disability,99 the
attractiveness of the defense to avoid or mitigate responsibility,"°° and the
prevalence of intoxication as an influential factor in homicide and many other
crimes."' 1

Justice O'Connor, who dissented, took exception to Justice Scalia's
historical analysis by noting that by the time the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified in 1868, many cases recognized the specific intent exception to the
intoxication ban.0 2 In fact, many state courts recognized the specific-general
intent rule as the foundation for common law concerning intoxication.0 3 Justice

with the growing realization that criminal liability is to be sharply differentiated from
moral delinquency, that intoxication has been allowed as an indirect defense insofar as
it negatives the existence of a specific intent required for certain crimes.").
95. Egelhoff,518 U.S. at 44 (quoting 1 HALE, supra note 1, at 32-33 n.3).
96. Id.
97. Id. at45.
98. Id.
99. Id. ("Now touching the trial of this incapacity... this is a matter of great
difficulty, partly from the easiness of counterfeiting the disability.., and partly from the
variety of the degrees of this infirmity.") (quoting 1 HALE, supra note 1, at 32).
100. Id. (quoting 1 FRANCIS WHARTON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 66, at 95
(1932)).
101. Id.

102. Id. at 69 (O'Conner, J., dissenting).
103. See White v. Arkansas, 717 S.W.2d 784 (Ark. 1986) (holding that "at common
law, evidence of voluntary intoxication, while no excuse for a crime, could be admitted

to show the defendant was incapable of forming the specific intent necessary for the
crime") (citing Wood v. Arkansas, 34 Ark. 341 (1879)).
Many writers as early as the 17th century recognized that drunkenness could be an
excuse for murder. See Sayre, supranote 94, at 997 ("[Ain intentional killing, whether
from rage, drunkenness, or hidden displeasure, if committed 'on the sudden,' is
considered at the opening of the seventeenth century to be without malice

aforethought.").
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999

17

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 3
MISSOUR LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 64

O'Connor emphasized that the constitutional safeguards of compulsory process
and cross-examination are also deeply rooted. ° Justice Scalia noted, however,
that the specific-general intent movement in America was "slow to take root,"
and lacked uniform application among the states. °5 The stem rejection of
intoxication as a defense became a fixture of early American law."°
4. Public Policy Implications
Besides "historical pedigree," due process analysis requires a careful policy
description of the asserted fundamental principles. 07 Intoxication is neither
justifiable nor excusable conduct. There may be some benefit in drinking
alcohol to relieve social anxieties, but there is no public benefit or excuse in
abusive drinking that causes harm to others. While Justice Scalia did not launch
a philosophical tirade on utilitarian values, he noted the public policy
implications of eliminating the intoxication defense. 0 8 A large number of
violent crimes are committed by intoxicated offenders. Modem studies reveal
that half of all homicides are caused or significantly influenced by

104. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 71 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice
O'Connor asserted:
We cannot consider only the historical disallowance of intoxication evidence,
but must also consider the 'fundamental principle' that a defendant has a right
to a fair opportunity to put forward his defense, in adversarial testing where
the State must prove the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt
....
As concepts ofmens rea and burden of proof developed, these principles
came into conflict, as the shift in the common law in the 19th century reflects.
Id.
105. Justice Scalia recognized that the origin of the specific intent formula is often
traced to a 1819 English case, in which Justice Holroyd is reported to have held that
"though voluntary drunkenness cannot excuse from the commission of crime, yet where,
as on a charge of murder, the material question is, whether an act was premeditated or
done only with sudden heat and impulse, the fact of the party being intoxicated [is] a
circumstance proper to be taken into consider." Id. at 46 (citing King v. Grindley,
Worchester Sum. Assizes (1819)). Years later, according to Justice Scalia, Justice
Holroyd disavowed this position. Id. (citing King v. Carroll, 173 Eng. Rep. 64, 65
(N.P.)).
Many states still abided by the common law approach. See, e.g., Harris v. United
States, 8 App. D.C. 20, 29 (1896); McDaniel v. Mississippi, 356 So. 2d 1151, 1158
(Miss. 1978) (noting that rule remained in effect until 1932); Missouri v. Harlow, 21 Mo.
446,458 (1855); New York v. Register, 457 N.E.2d 704, 709 (N.Y. 1983), cert. denied,
466 U.S. 953 (1984) (noting that, in 1881, New York modified rule by statute); New
York v. Rogers, 18 N.Y. 2, 9, 27 (1858) (stating that it "is not law" that jury should be
instructed to consider intoxication of defendant in determining intent with which
homicide was committed); Vermont v. Tatro, 50 Vt. 481,491 (1878).
106. Egelhoff,518 U.S. at44.
107. Id. at 47.
108. Id. at 49.
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intoxication. 19 Eliminating self-induced intoxication as an excuse for crimes
deters drunkenness or irresponsible behavior, serves to incapacitate dangerous
people, and inspires personal accountability. "
5. States' Rights
The decision posed in Egelhoffis a victory for states' rights in that a state
may reduce the level of culpability considered sufficient to hold an intoxicated
drinker criminally liable for a deliberate homicide. By leaving decisions to the
legislative branch, society as a whole can respond to changing mores and
progressive legal perceptions about inebriation. Many experts recognize that
drinkers are not powerless in regulating their consumption. 1 '
Justice Scalia concluded:
"The doctrines of actus reus, mens rea, insanity, mistake, justification,
and duress have historically provided the tools for a constantly shifting
adjustment of the tension between the evolving aims of the criminal
law and changing religious, moral, philosophical, and medical views
of the nature of man. This process of adjustment has always been
thought to be the province of the States." The people of Montana have
decided to resurrect the rule of an earlier era, disallowing
consideration of voluntary intoxication when a defendant's state of
mind is at issue.2 Nothing in the Due Process clause prevents them
from doing so."

109. Id. See also Note, AlcoholAbuse and the Law, supra note 10, at 1681-82.

110. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 49 (1996). Justice Souter dissented
because he believed the State of Montana did not present a valid justification for
eliminating the intoxication defense. Id. at 73 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter
commented:
A State may typically exclude even relevant and exculpatory evidence if it
presents a valid justification for doing so. There may (or may not) be a valid
justification to support a State's decision to exclude, rather than render
irrelevant, evidence of a defendant's voluntary intoxication. Montana has not
endeavored, however, to advance an argument to that effect.
Id.

111. In Traynorv. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535 (1988), the United States Supreme Court
recognized the work of Herbert Fingarette that drinkers vary in degree and have the
ability to regulate their consumption. Id. at 550-51 (citing Herbert Fingarette, The Perils
of Powell: In Search ofa FactualFoundationfor the "DiseaseConcept ofAlcoholism,"
83 HARV. L. Rv. 793, 802-08 (1970)).
112. Egelhoff,518 U.S. at 56 (internal citations omitted). See supra notes 8-9 and
accompanying texts for the states that currently ban the intoxication excuse and the other
states which are considering the ban.
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Besides upholding the state's right to eliminate the intoxication excuse, the
Egelhoffdecision also clarified the meaning of "fundamental" defenses."' The
decision ascertained that "fundamental" defenses must be determined from
history and tradition. Yet intoxication, by many accounts, was a growing excuse
in early American common law to first degree murder in several jurisdictions.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ignored America's volatile history regarding
alcoholic indulgence and narrowed its historical focus to the seminal stages of
early American and English common law when intoxication aggravated, rather
than mitigated, an offense. A "fundamental" defense must be one that is
uniformly accepted in history. Only a "fundamental" defense can supersede a
legislative ban.
III. BIFURCATIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS: GENERAL AND SPECIFIC
INTENT CRIMES
The Supreme Court's decision in Montanav. Egelhoffhas little bearing on
the majority of states which, unlike Montana, recognize the specific-general
intent test to determine the admissibility of intoxication. Montana's statutory
scheme of deliberate homicide differs considerably from the majority of states,
which divide homicide into first and second degree offenses. Moreover,
Montana is one of the few states that specifically bans intoxication as a defense
to all major crimes. Approximately forty-three states allow intoxication as a

113. The elimination of the intoxication defense was not the primary issue before
the Montana Supreme Court in Egelhoff The primary issue concerned whether
intoxication is relevant to mens rea. Montana Justice Nelson, in a concurring opinion,
clarified Montana's position regarding the admissibility of the intoxication defense:
I write separately only because of my lingering concern that our decision will
be misread as allowing an affirmative defense of voluntary intoxication in
criminal cases. That is absolutely not so. This case is not about a defense.
Rather, it deals with burden of proof and the fundamental obligation of the
State to prove each element of a criminal charge-including mental state
element-beyond a reasonable doubt.
Montana v. Egelhoff, 900 P.2d 260, 267-68 (Mont. 1995) (Nelson, J., concurring).
However, the United States Supreme Court reviewed this issue because it was

sufficiently preserved. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996).
In Delaware, where intoxication is no defense to any crimes, the court allowed the
accused to testify to his own intoxication, but the accused could not present expert

witnesses to the intoxication, nor could the lay witnesses testify as to defendant's normal
behavior, nor could defense counsel argue defendant's intoxication as a defense during
closing arguments. See Wyant v. Delaware, 519 A.2d 649 (Del. 1986).
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defense to specific intent or purposeful crimes.'1 4 The manner in which specific
intent evolved as a pivotal mental element must be examined.
In early English history, the mental elements in criminal law overlapped
with tort law into a general Law of Wrongs."5 Principles of causation and
absolute liability settled personal injury disputes." 6 While subjective intent
played a role in punitive consequences, the accused was absolutely liable for
causing harn to another. Jail,
fines, or restitution interchangeably settled
7
1
claims.
tort
and
law
criminal
As time evolved, tort law and criminal law diverged, and the requirement
of the mens rea became increasingly important." 8 Several English scholars

resuscitated the classic Roman and Greek view of personal fault, mea culpa, as
the standard for culpability." 9 Ecclesiastic power matured and clerics instructed

that the mental element of sin equaled the physical act. 2' "Whosoever looketh

114. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.630 (Michie 1996) (providing intoxication
"is relevant to negate an element of the offense that requires that the defendant
intentionally cause a result"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 22(b) (West 1999) ("[I]ntoxication is
admissible solely on the issue of whether or not the defendant actually formed a required
specific intent ...."); Colorado v. Low, 732 P.2d 622 (Colo. 1987) ("Evidence of
voluntary intoxication constitutes a defense to specific intent crimes, but is incompetent
as a defense to general intent crimes.") (interpreting COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-1-804
(1998)); Idaho v. Hall, 727 P.2d 1255 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986) (interpreting IDAHO CODE
§ 18-116 (1997)); Michigan v. Langworthy, 331 N.W.2d 171, 173 (Mich. 1982)
("Almost every state, by statute or by common law, has adopted the exculpatory rule.");
New Jersey v. Cameron, 514 A.2d 1302 (N.J. 1986).
115. See THEODORE F.T. PLUcKNET, A CONCISE HISTORY

OF COMMON LAW

463

(5th ed. 1956); Sayre, supra note 94, at 976-77 ("[T]here was no distinction in those
[early] days between crime and tort ....[P]rimitive English law started from a basis
bordering on absolute liability. [I]n the recorded law prior to the twelfth century, a
criminal intent was not recognized as an indispensable requisite for criminality.").
116. Sayre, supra note 94, at 977 (stating classical "English law started from a
basis bordering on absolute liability").
117. PLUCKNETT, supra note 115, at 421.
In the words of Sir James Fitz James Stepphen: Fines were paid on every
imaginable occasion... at every stage of every sort of legal proceeding, and
for every description of official default, irregularity, or impropriety. In short,
the practice of fining was so prevalent that if punishment is taken as a test of
a criminal offence, and fines are regarded as a form of punishment, it is
almost impossible to say where the criminal law in early times began or
ended ....It is impossible practically to draw the line between what was
paid by way of fees and what was paid by way of penal fines.
PLUCKNETr, supra note 115, at 421.
118. PAUL H. ROBINSON, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL LAW 184 (2d ed. 1995).
119. Sayre, supra, note 94, at 982-83.
120. "The canonists had long insisted that the mental element was the real criterion
of guilt and under their influence the conception of subjective blameworthiness as the
foundation of legal guilt was making itself strongly felt." Sayre, supra note 94, at 980.
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on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his
heart." 21 Penance rested significantly on the accused's state of mind. 22 The
early felonies, malum in se crimes, were the "external manifestations of the
heinous sins of the day. ' 1 3
The appreciation for criminal defenses and excuses derived from the
English Law of Pardons, wherein the King gradually freed from criminal
responsibility those who killed without guilty intent. 24 The Law of Pardons,
adopted by the English courts, divided homicides into various degrees depending
upon the mental element. "The ancient concept of malice aforethought was an
early attempt to focus on the mental state in order to distinguish those who
deserved death from those who through 'Benefit of Clergy' would be spared."' 25
As judicial decisionmaking carefully discriminated each case, precise mental
elements became clearer for various crimes. 26 Each felony27involved different
social interests, and consequently, divergent mental states.
The growing influence of the Renaissance period also conceptualized
personal fault and tragedy as a solution to violent murderous deeds: "0 that this
,,2 William Shakespeare's Hamlet was the
too too sullied flesh would melt ....
epitome of the beguiled Renaissance man:
I have heard that guilty creatures sitting at a play
Have by the very cunning of the scene
Been struck so to the soul that presently
They have proclaimed their malefactions.
More relative than this. The play's the thing

121. Sayre, supranote 94, at 983 (quoting JOSEPH CULLEN AYER, JR., A SOURCE
BOOK FOR ANCIENT CHURCH HISTORY 626 (1913)).

122. Sayre, supranote 94, at 983 ("If he has thought on a sin and determines to
commit it,but is prevented in the execution so is the sin the same, but not the penance.")
(citing AYER, supranote 121, at 626).
123. Sayre, supranote 94, at 989.
124. Sayre, supra note 94, at 994-95.
125. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156 (1987). See also A.K.R. KIRALFY,
PITrER'S HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAW AND ITS INSTITUTIONS 361 (1962).
126. KIRALFY, supra note 125, at 355-56. Kiralfy commented:

In the reign of Edward III we also see emerging very clearly the notion that
the wrong will be felonious or not according to the intention of the party to
do something essentially wrong ....It is suggested that it was the growth of
mens rea, or intention, in felony that caused the gap between crime and tort
that appears in the fifteenth century.
KIRALFY, supra note 125, at 355-56.
127. Sayre, supra note 94, at 994.
128. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 1, sc. 2, at 39 (Wilard Famham ed.,

1985).
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Wherein I'll catch the conscience of the king. 29
The culmination of the legal, religious, and cultural forces moved the
criminal law of England to require a greater sense of moral blameworthiness. 3
"Early law was indifferent to the defence of drunkenness because the theory of
criminal liability was too crude and too undeveloped to admit of exceptions..
But with the refinement in the theory of criminal liability... a modification
of the rigid old rule on the defence of drunkenness was to be expected.''
All crimes now originate with a general intent, the basic mens rea,
consisting of various layers of criminal negligence, or recklessness, or intent to
commit a criminal act.132 For a general intent crime, the prosecution must prove
that the defendant voluntarily performed the wrongful act. 33 Criminal
negligence and recklessness form the category of general intent because these
culpable mental states identify a gross deviation from the standard of care that
a reasonable person should exercise. 34 Recklessness also contemplates a
subjective awareness of a high degree of risk, short of actual intent.'35
The specific-general intent bifurcation depends on whether "intent" is
specifically itemized as a distinct element of an offense. 3 6 "Specific intent"
means that the prosecution must prove not only that the accused did certain acts,
but that the accused accomplished the acts with the intent to cause a particular
result. Whether an offense is a specific intent crime depends initially on
legislative intent. 137 Frequently, the offense contains identifiable words in the
name of the statute or in the statutory definition that indicate a heightened intent
prerequisite. In determining legislative intent, courts focus on expressive terms
129. Id. at 86.
130. ROBINSON, supra note 118, at 185; Sayre, supra note 94, at 994.

131. Singh, supra note 1, at 537.
132. Id. See also Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957) ("We do not go
with Blackstone in saying that 'a vicious will' is necessary to constitute a crime, for
conduct alone without regard to the intent of the doer is often sufficient."); Michigan v.
Langworthy, 331 N.W.2d. 171, 174 (Mich. 1982); Washington v. Coates, 735 P.2d 64,
69 (Wash. 1987).
133. Michigan v. Lardie, 551 N.W.2d 656, 661 (Mich. 1996); Langworthy, 331
N.W.2d at 173.
134. See New York v. Register, 457 N.E.2d 704 (N.Y. 1983), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 953 (1984) (holding that a person acts recklessly when he/she consciously
disregards a substantial or unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a prohibited
result will follow, and this disregard constitutes a gross deviationfrom the standardof
care that a reasonableperson would exercise in the situation);Paulsen, supra note 13,
at 13; see also New Jersey v. Cameron, 514 A.2d 1302, 1307 (N.J. 1986) ("A 'general
intent' can be equated with that which the Code defines as 'recklessness' or criminal
negligence.'").
135. California v. Whitfield, 868 P.2d 272, 275 n.2 (Cal. 1994).
136. Langworthy, 331 N.W.2d at 182.
137. Id.
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such as "wilfulness,', 138 purposely 139 "knowingly,' 40 or "intent to."'' If the
matter is still unclear, the courts employ a myriad of judicial exercises to
determine legislative intent. 42
English jurisdictions refer to the specific intent formula as "ulterior
44
intent."'4 3 "Ulterior intent" is an added element beyond the basic act itself.
When the definition of a crime describes a particular act and identifies an intent
to do a further act or achieve a future consequence, this crime is deemed to have
an ulterior intent. 45 Assault with intent to kill, for instance,
requires proof of an
14
assault and equal proof of the future intent to murder.

138. Id. at 179. See Michigan v. Beaudin, 339 N.W.2d 461, 463 (Mich. 1983)
(holding "willful" endangerment statute required specific intent instruction); Michigan
v. Garcia, 247 N.W.2d 547, 550 (Mich. 1976) (holding that "wilful" killing means the
"intent to accomplish the result of death"); see also WILLIAM LAWRENCE CLARK &
WILLIAM L. MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMEs 72 (5th ed. 1952).
139. See New Jersey v. Cameron, 514 A.2d 1302, 1307 (N.J. 1986).
140. See New Jersey v. Ghaul, 334 A.2d 65, 67 (N.J. 1975).
141. See California v. Hood, 462 P.2d 370 (Cal. 1969); Terry v. Indiana, 465
N.E.2d 1085, 1088 (Ind. 1984); Note, Intoxication as a CriminalDefense, supra note 6,
at 1212 n.13.
142. See Michigan v. Lardie, 551 N.W.2d 656 (Mich. 1996); Michigan v.
Langworthy, 331 N.W.2d 171, 176 (Mich. 1982)*(reviewing legislative intent in new
criminal sexual conduct statute); see also CLARK & MARSHALL, supra note 138, at 46.
There are many ways a court can unravel legislative intent. First, the courts give ordinary
meaning to the language of the statute if that meaning can be clearly ascertained.
Second, the courts look into the reason and purpose of the statute. Pre-existing laws are
"useful guides in the interpretation of a doubtful statute." CLARK & MARSHALL, supra
note 138, at 47. Third, "[i]t is a well-settled principle... that the preamble and the title,
though they are no part of an act, may be resorted to as an aid in ascertaining the
intention of the legislature." CLARK & MARSHALL, supra note 138, at 48. Fourth,
"[w]hen a statute uses other terms, which have a settled meaning in the common law, this
meaning is to be given them, unless there is something to show that the legislature
intended otherwise." CLARK & MARSHALL, supranote 138, at 48-49. Fifth, "[w]hen the
legislature enacts a statute which is substantially the same as one which has already
received ajudicial construction, it will be presumed to have known that construction, and
to have intended to adopt it, even though such knowledge be contrary to the facts."
CLARK &MARSHALL, supranote 138, at 49-50. Sixth, "[i]n ascertaining the meaning of
a particular statute, all statutes on the same subject.., are to be taken together as one
law." CLARK & MARSHALL, supra note 138, at 50.
143. Director ofPublic Prosecutions v. Majewski, House of Lords, 2 All E.R1 142
(1976).
144. Roberts v. Michigan, 19 Mich. 401,414 (1870).
145. See Lardie, 551 N.W.2d at 660; see also Langworthy, 331 N.W.2d at 174;
Pennsylvania v. Graves, 334 A.2d 661, 663 (Pa. 1975), superceded by statute as
recognized in Pennsylvania v. Garcia, 479 A.2d 473 (Pa. 1984); CLARK & MARSHALL,
supra note 137, at 78; Note, AlcoholAbuse and the Law, supra note 10, at 1683.
146. See supranote 142. Theft requires the intent to steal and equal proof of intent
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss2/3
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Some American jurisdictions refer to the specific intent formula as the

exculpatory rule.' 47 These jurisdictions believe that evidence of intoxication
excuses the heightened intent element. If the offense requires a specific goal
directed mentality, like first degree premeditated murder, then there is a
heightened intent requirement:
While it is true that drunkenness cannot excuse crime, it is equally true
that when a certain intent is a necessary element in a crime, the
crime
48
cannot have been committed when the intent did not exist.
The specific intent formula derived principally from murder offenses where
the courts acknowledged the fundamental incongruity of a premeditated intent
requirement on the one hand, and the exclusion of evidence that might defeat a
cool, calm, premeditated murder on the other. 149 In Pennsylvaniav. McFall,15"
for instance, the court held that drunkenness does not incapacitate an individual,
but frequently mitigates a heightened intent. The court determined that
drunkenness clouds the understanding and excites the passions.' If a person
was grossly intoxicated, the court reasoned, then that person could not form the
requisite specific intent to plot murder. 2

to permanently deprive. Michigan v. Walker, 38 Mich. 156, 158 (1878).
147. Michigan v. Langworthy, 331 N.W. 2d 171, 173 (Mich. 1982).
148. Id.
149. InPigmanv. Ohio, 14 Ohio 555 (1846), the court stated: "Drunkenness is no
excuse for crime; yet, in that class of crimes and offenses which depend upon guilty
knowledge, or the coolness and deliberation with which they shall have been perpetrated,
to constitute their commission . . . [drunkenness] should be submitted to the

consideration of the jury" for, where the crime required a particular mental state, "it is
proper to show any state or condition of the person that is adverse to the proper exercise
of the mind" in order "to rebut that knowledge, or to enable the jury to judge rightly of
the matter.... ." Id. at 556-57. See also Mooney v. Alabama, 33 Ala. 419, 420 (1859);

Aszman v. Indiana, 24 N.E. 123 (Ind. 1890); Iowa v. Donovan, 16 N.W. 206, 207 (Iowa
1883); Cline v. Ohio, 1 N.E. 22,23 (Ohio 1885); Swan v. Tennessee, 23 Tenn. 136, 14142 (1843).
150. 1 Pa. Rep. (Addison) 255, 257 (1794) ("Drunkenness does not incapacitate
a man for forming a premeditated design of murder, but frequently suggests it. A drunk
man may certainly be guilty of murder. But as drunkenness clouds the understanding and
excites passion, it may be evidence of passion only, and of want of malice and design.").
151. Id.
152. Id. See also United States v. Roudenbush, 27 Fed. Cas. 902 (1832) (No.
16,198) (holding that intoxication evidence could be a defense in a counterfeiting case,
which requires specific intent); California v. Whitfield, 868 P.2d 272,290-93 (Cal. 1994)
(Mosk, J., dissenting) (discussing the history of intoxication); McIntyre v. Illinois, 38111.
514, 520 (1865) (holding that intoxication could be a defense to premeditated murder).
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Once murder offenses identified a specific intent pattern, other felonies
followed a similar logical course.'53 If an offense explicitly requires a specific
intent on its face, then it requires heightened mental sophistication. 5 4 "Some
intent... would naturally involve
a greater number of ideas, and require a more
s55
complicated mental process.'
It seemed inequitable to some courts to punish a person for a result that was
unintended by intoxication, so the common law began to recognize several
exculpatory concepts, such as insanity, compulsion, intoxication, and specific
intent. "As the concept of moral blameworthiness grew in importance in
American criminal law, courts for the first time were forced to grapple with
instances in which harm was caused by a person with a diminished mental
capacity."' 56 Adoption of the specific intent principle reflected changing societal
perceptions regarding the intent and immorality of abusive alcohol use.157 There
grew an affinity for the alcoholic since many judges, attorneys, and jurors shared
society's indulgence for abusive drinking. Many courts orchestrated a
compromise between the feelings
of sympathy versus the feelings of reprobation
58
for the intoxicated offender.
That is the quality of a demon; whilst that which is done on great
excitement, as when the mind is broken up by poison or intoxication,
although, to be punished, may, to some extent, be softened and set
down to the infirmities of human nature. 59

153.

See David McCord, The English and American History of Voluntary

Intoxication to Negate Mens Rea, 11 J. LEGAL HIST. 372, 380-84 (1990); see also

Hassman, Voluntary DrugIntoxication, supranote 21, at 144.
154. Pigman v. Ohio, 14 Ohio 555 (1846) (holding that intoxication is a defense
to counterfeiting).
155. Roberts v. Michigan, 19 Mich. 401, 418 (1870). Many offenses required a
"peculiar knowledge, nice discrimination and judgment, deliberation and premeditation."
Id. at 418.
156. See Sayre, supra note 94, at 1004.
157. Pigman, 14 Ohio at 555.

158. California v. Hood, 462 P.2d 370,377 (Cal. 1969); see also K. AUSTIN KERR,
ch. 1, at 12-14 (1985) (contending that the profit motive
encouraged excessive drinking).
159. Pigman v. Ohio, 14 Ohio 555, 556 (1846).
ORGANIZED FOR PROHIBITION
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Early statutes also imposed a specific intent requirement."W The language
of California Penal Code Section 22, drafted in 1872, when "specific" and
"general" intent were not yet terms of art, stated:
No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary
intoxication is less criminal by reason of his having been in such
condition. But whenever the actual existence of any particular
purpose, motive or intent is a necessary element to constitute any
particular species or degree of crime, the jury may take into
considerationthefact that the accused was intoxicated at the time, in
determining the purpose, motive, or intent with which he committed
61
the act.
The specific intent doctrine reversed the assumptions that intoxicated
persons were as physiologically culpable as sober persons.162 Intoxicated
persons with directionless intent were less culpable than sober persons with evil
design. 63 According to many courts, intoxication did not excuse what a
defendant did; rather, intoxication excused what the defendant did not do-form
the intent to kill.' 64

160. In 1876, Utah law provided as follows:
No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication is less
criminal by reason of his having been in such condition. But whenever the
actual existence of any particular purpose, motive, or intent is a necessary
element to constitute any particular species or degree of crime, the jury may
take into consideration the fact that the accused was intoxicated at the time,
in determining the purpose, motive, or intent with which he committed the
act.
Cited in Hopt v. People, 104 U.S. 631, 634 (1881). KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3208(2)
(Supp. 1972), provided:
An act committed while in a state of voluntary intoxication is not less criminal
by reason thereof, but when a particular intent or other state of mind is a
necessary element to constitute a particular crime, the fact of intoxication may
be taken into consideration in determining such intent or state of mind.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3208(2) (Supp. 1972).
161. CAL. PEN. CODE § 22 (1872).
162. McCord, supra note 153, at 380-85.
163. Pigman, 14 Ohio at 555. In Pigman,'the court stated:
[I]t seems strange that any one should ever have imagined that a person who
committed an act from the effect of drink, which he would have done if sober,
is worse than the man who commits it from sober and deliberate intent. The
law regards an act done in sudden heat, in a moment of frenzy, when passion
has disthroned reason, as less criminal than the same act when performed in
the cool and undisturbed possession of all the faculties.
Id. at 556. See also McCord, supra note 153, at 380-84.
164. Roberts v. Michigan, 19 Mich. 385, 393 (1870) (Appellant's brief).
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A. An Added IncapacityStandard
Many courts refused to accept such a benigned attitude towards intoxicated
intent. As Judge Burger noted, "[d]runkenness, while efficient to reduce or
remove inhibitions, does not readily negate intent. 165 A grossly intoxicated
person commits the very harm he or she intends; "typically what is lacking is
control and ethical sensitivity."'" As stated in Washington v. Coates,
A person can be intoxicated yet still be able to form the requisite
mental state, or he can be so intoxicated as to be unconscious .... It
is not the fact of intoxication which is relevant, but the degree of
intoxication and the effect it had on the defendant's ability to
formulate the requisite mental state.'67
Nearly all courts require an incapacity standardin determining whether to
admit intoxication evidence. 68 The amount of intoxication must be extremely
high to negate specific intent or premeditation, requiring in some instances,

prostration of the faculties. 69 If the accused's mental faculties were so far

165. Heideman v. United States, 259 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 959 (1959). See also New Jersey v. Stasio, 396 A.2d 1129 (N.J. 1979),
superceded by statute as recognized in New Jersey v. Cameron, 514 A.2d 1302 (N.J.

1986). In Stasio, the court stated:
Until a stuporous condition is reached or the entire motor area of the brain is
profoundly affected, the probability of the existence of intent remains. The
initial effect of alcohol is the reduction or removal of inhibitions or restraints.
But that does not vitiate intent. The loosening of the tongue has been said to
disclose a person's true sentiments in vino veritas.
Id. at 1134.
166. Jerome Hall, Intoxication and CriminalResponsibility, 57 HARv. L. REV.
1045, 1065 (1944). See also Stasio, 396 A.2d at 1134.

167. 735 P.2d 64, 69 (Wash. 1987).
168. Michigan v. Mills, 537 N.W.2d 909, 920 (Mich. 1995) (holding that "there
was some evidence that the defendants appeared intoxicated, but there was no testimony
that the defendant actually was intoxicated, or was intoxicated to a point at which he was
incapable of forming the intent to commit the charged crime").
169. See Connecticut v. Johnson, 40 Conn. 136, 143 (1873) (holding that
intoxication must be "of such a degree as to impair the capacity of the prisoner to form
a deliberate premeditated purpose to take life"); Keenan v. Commonwealth, 44 Pa. 56,
57 (1862) (holding that intoxication is no excuse, "unless it was so great as to render him
'unable to form a wilful, deliberate, and premeditated design to kill"'); see also Shepherd
v. Welbom, 848 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. I111994); Latimore v. Alabama, 534 So. 2d 665,
667-68 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988); Weaver v. Indiana, 643 N.E.2d 342 (Ind. 1994);
Nebraska v. Lesiak, 449 N.W.2d 550 (Neb. 1989); New Jersey v. Cameron, 514 A.2d
1302, 1309-10 (N.J. 1986); New York v. Rodriguez, 564 N.E.2d 658 (N.Y. 1990); New
York v. Collins, 507 N.Y.S.2d 252 (1986); North Carolina v. Brown, 439 S.E.2d 589
(N.C. 1994); Pennsylvania v. Cessna, 537 A.2d 834 (Pa. 1988); CLARK & MARSHALL,
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overcome by the intoxication that the accused was not conscious of the accused's
criminal acts or why the accused committed the acts, then the accused lacked the
requisite specific intent. 70
While several states still adhere to the incapacity standard in determining
the admissibility of intoxication, many courts allow intoxication as a defense if
there is any evidence in support of the claimed intoxication. The incapacity
standard inadvertently encourages a peculiar paradox. Once an intoxicated
offender is on the slippery slope of abusive drinking, the offender might as well
thoroughly indulge in order to be exculpated.
B. Criticisms ofthe Specific-GeneralIntent Test
Many jurists and legal commentators criticize the specific intent formula
because the formula is frequently illogical, inconsistent, and inequitable. The
specific-general intent test is notoriously difficult to define and apply. 7 The
specific intent principle at times produces unusual results in that often lesser
included offenses are specific intent crimes, where intoxication is a defense,
while the major offenses are general intent crimes, where intoxication is no
defense." Jurors are given cofifusing instructions that allow for the intoxication
defense for some lesser included offenses, yet disallow it for other offenses in
the same category." For instance, the offense of assault with intent to commit
rape is considered a specific intent offense, where intoxication may be a defense,
yet the greater offense of rape is a general intent offense, where intoxication is
no defense. 74 Somejurists respond that the requirement of a specific intent for
lesser crimes exists because of a desire to protect the individual against
conviction on slight evidence. 75 Nevertheless, Professor Joshua Dressier notes
that "nothing commends this dual approach towards the general versus specific
intent principle. The accused's [motives], intent, and culpability are the same in
both cases of rape and assault with intent to rape. The accused is equally
dangerous and principles of general deterrence demand equal treatment."' 76 The

supranote 138, at 96.
170. Roberts v. Michigan, 19 Mich. 385, 418 (1870).
171. California v. Hood, 462 P.2d 370 (Cal. 1969).
172. See New Jersey v. Stasio, 396 A.2d 1129, 1133 (N.J. 1979) (holding that the

general-specific intent test gives rise to "incongruous results by irrationally allowing
intoxication to excuse some crimes but not others"), supercededby statute as recognized
in New. Jersey v. Cameron, 514 A.2d 1302 (N.J. 1986); see also Michigan v.

Langworthy, 331 N.W.2d 171, 174 (Mich. 1982).
173. See supra note 160.
174. DRESSLER, supra note 22, at 299; United States v. Thorton, 498 F.2d 749,
752-53 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Langworthy, 331 N.W.2d at 175-77.

175. Thorton, 498 F.2d at 752-53.
176. DRESSLER, supra note 22, at 299.
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question, notes Dressier, "should be simply whether the defendant' 77did or did not
form the state of mind required in the definition of the offense.'
Additionally, it is illogical to allow a necessarilylesser included offense to
have a higher mental state than the greater crime. A greater offense includes all
elements of the lesser offense. If the greater offense is a general intent crime, the
lesser offense must have no greater mental element. Conversely, if the lesser
offense is interpreted to have specific intent elements, then the greater offense
must likewise have specific intent elements.
In United States v. Thorton, the court rejected this logical assertion by
explaining that "the requirement of a specific intent for lesser crimes exists
because of a desire to protect the individual against conviction on slight
evidence." 178 Attempt crimes, for instance, have little actus reus, so it must be
accompanied by a specific intent to accurately ensure the charge. But the court's
explanation nevertheless fails because most lesser included crimes have
substantial overt acts where a specific intent is superfluous.'
Without much
mental agility, one can ascertain that assault with intent to rape embodies an
abusive encounter where the accused intended some type of sexual penetration.
The accused's physical acts and declarations go a long way towards manifesting
the intent, which is no more sophisticated than the greater crime of rape.
A second problem associated with the specific intent formula is that of
conflicting interpretations. Some offenses are designated as specific intent
crimes, yet other jurisdictions call the same offenses general intent crimes.'
Several courts, for example, disagree on whether second degree murder is a
general or specific intent offense.' Second degree murder arguably is a specific

177. DRESSLER, supra note 22, at 300.
178. Thorton, 498 F.2d at 753.
179. One way around this logical dispute would be to recognize assault with intent
to commit rape as a cognate, or related, lesser. Cognate lessers may have additional

elements that do not exist in the greater offense. Whereas necessarilyincludedoffenses
must include only those elements existing in the greater offense. See Michigan v. Heflin,
456 N.W.2d 10 (Mich. 1990); Michigan v. Jones, 236 N.W.2d 461 (Mich. 1975).
180. See McCord, supra note 153, at 380-84. Compare Minnesota v. Garvey, 11

Minn. 154 (1865) (holding that assault with a deadly weapon is a specific intent crime),
with California v. Hood, 462 P.2d 370, 378 (Cal. 1969), and Connecticut v. Carter, 458
A.2d 369 (Conn. 1983) (holding that the offense is a general intent crime).

181. See California v. Whitfield, 868 P.2d 272, 275-76 (Cal. 1994) (holding that
intoxication could be a defense to second degree murder, a general intent offense,
because the statute's reference to malice aforethought was intended to encompass both
the mental states of express malice and implied malice); Michigan v. Langworthy, 331
N.W.2d 171, 181 (Mich. 1982) (holding that intoxication is no defense to second degree
murder); New York v. Register, 457 N.E.2d 704, 709-14 (N.Y. 1983) (holding that
intoxication is no defense to second degree murder), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 953 (1984).
But see Langworthy, 331 N.W.2d at 182 (Levin, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is hypertechnical
to classify second degree murder, which has 'intent to' elements, as a general intent

crime."); Register, 457 N.E.2d at 709 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
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intent crime when the prosecution proceeds upon a theory of expressed
malice-a spontaneous intent to kill. Conversely, second degree murder is a
general intent crime when the prosecution proceeds on a theory of implied
malice-where one's conscious disregard endangers the life of another.
Conflicting judicial interpretations on major issues like homicide cause untold
confusion.
Professor Jerome Hall notes that another problem with the specific intent
doctrine is that it lacks psychological proof.182 There is no scientific evidence
presented to confirm the intuitive assumption that alcohol obliterates specific
intent thoughts, but not general intent thoughts. 18 Professor Hall, in 1948, noted
that the intention to perform a bodily movement is usually inseparable from the
reason why the movement is performed.184 He adds: "[T]he distinction between
'specific' and 'general' intent is a legal fiction, not psychological fact; the
paramount fact is that neither common experience nor psychology knows any
such actual phenomenon as 'general intent' which is distinguishable from
'specific intent."'18'5
Under the specific intent theory, for example, intoxication may be a defense
to first degree murder because it can dilute the sophisticated intent element of
premeditation and deliberation. Yet, intoxication can equally dilute the mental
element in rape offenses, a general intent crime, especially on the complicated
elements of consent or force. Intoxication clouds one's perceptions of consent,
especially in "date-rape" situations, where the accused and the victim have been
drinking.1 86 Intoxication, for both the accuser and the accused, embellishes and

182. See McCord, supra note 153, at 378-82 (citing to J. HALL, GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 450 (1948)); see also Hood, 462 P.2d at 378 (holding
"there is no real difference [between a general intent and a specific intent] ....
only a
linguistic one, between an intent to do an act already performed and an intent to do same
act in the future").
183. See McCord, supranote 153, at 378-82 (citing HALL, supranote 182, at 450).
184. See McCord, supranote 153, at 378-82 (citing HALL, supranote 182, at 450).
185. California v. Hood, 462 P.2d 370, 378 (Cal. 1969). See also Note, Alcohol
Abuse and the Law, supranote 10, at 1684 ("Use of the specific/general intent approach
to determine an offender's criminal responsibility is unsound. Both general and specific
intent crimes require a particular intent.").
186. See CAROLINE KNAPP, DRINKING: A Lov STORY 79 (1996) (contending that
the problems in current date rape situations are due, not as much to male-female debates
on sexual independence versus victimization, but to "booze"). Drinking is more than a
complicating factor in this issue, drinking interferes yet embellishes the "larger, murkier
business of identity, of forming a sense of the self as strong and capable and aware." Id.
at 80.
In response to the date rape scenario and binge drinking deaths, many universities
have passed anti-drinking rules on campus. Reports of date rape crimes have dropped
dramatically, but alcoholic deaths continues to haunt the college campuses. See Mary
Beth Marklein, Lifting an Alcoholic Fog, Colleges Hope Frank Talk Will Change
Attitudes About Drinking,USA TODAY, Nov. 16, 1998, at 1-D.
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interferes with the larger, murkier business of identity, inhibitions, confidence,
and perceptions.
The commission of a general intent offense requires a culpable mental state
on several levels. The inherent variety of elements, even to general intent
crimes, requires mental sophistication to perform integrated tasks.'87 Every
offense conceives of an act performed voluntarily with a culpable mental state
for each element of the offense. Hall continued:
Each crime... has its distinctive mens rea, e.g., intending to have
forced intercourse, intending to break and enter a dwelling house and
to commit a crime, intending to inflict a battery, and so on. It is
evident that there must be as many mens rea as there are crimes. And
whatever else may be said about an intention, an essential
characteristic of it is that it is directed towards a definite end. To
assert therefore that an intention is "specific" is to employ a
superfluous term .... 188
A fourth problem with the specific intent formula is that it fails to meet
explicit public policy objectives. In New Jersey v. Stasio,'8 9 the court reasoned
that dogmatic adherence to the artificial and strict distinctions between general
and specific intent crimes "undermines the criminal law's primary function of
protecting society from the results of behavior that endangers the public
safety."19 The court explained that the protection of society "should be our

187. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962), sets forth its general requirements of
culpability as follows: "(1) Minimum Requirements of Culpability. Except as provided
in Section 2.05 [absolute liability offenses], a person is not guilty of an offense unless
he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with
respect to each material element of the offense." (emphasis added). See also In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that the State must prove every element of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt).
188. McCord, supra note 153, at 385 (citing HALL, supranote 182, at 450). See
also Sayre, supra note 94, at 1020. Sayre states:
The slow progression of the criminal law from motive to intent has
constituted ... a healthy growth; but one must guard against a too minute
particularization which runs counter to the modem movement for generalizing
and grouping together crimes of the same general nature .... [C]rimes
involving a specific intent vary as widely with regard to the requisite intent
as with the requisite act .... A.study of the specific intent required for one
such crime is ofbut little assistance in determining the precise mental element
necessary for another.
Sayre, supranote 94, at 1020.
189. 396 A.2d 1129 (N.J. 1979) (holding that assault with intent to commit armed
robbery is a specific intent crime, but disallowed intoxication as a defense), superceded
by statute as recognized in New Jersey v. Cameron, 514 A.2d 1302 (N.J. 1986).
190. Id. at 1134. See also New York v. Rogers, 18 N.Y. 2 (1858). In Rogers,
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guide rather than concern with logical consistency in terms of any single theory
of culpability, particularly in view of the fact that alcohol is significantly
involved in a substantial number of offenses. The demands of public safety and
the harm done are identical irrespective of the offender's reduced ability to
restrain himself due to his drinking.' '91 The court concluded that the specific
intent principle encourages incongruous results by irrationally allowing
intoxication to excuse some crimes but not others. 92 Moreover, a large number
of assaults, which are commonly caused by intoxication, would go unpunished
193
if intoxication evidence could defeat the intent requirement.
In United States v. Nix, 94 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed:
Categorizing all crimes as either having "general" or "specific" intent
seems too mechanical and often forecloses evaluation by the court of
the important consideration involved, i.e., what elements are involved
in the crime and whether the prosecution has satisfactorily established
them. 195
Despite the growing dissatisfaction with the specific intent formula, specific
intent crimes are highly popular, matching the number of general intent

Judge Denio stated:
[T]here is no doubt considerable difference between a murder deliberately
planned and executed by a person of unclouded intellect, and the reckless
taking of life by one infuriated by intoxication; but human laws are based
upon considerations of policy, and look rather to the maintenance of personal
security and social order than to an accurate discrimination as to the moral
qualities of individual conduct. But there is, in truth, no injusticein holding
a person responsible for his acts committed in a state of voluntary
intoxication. It is a duty which everyone owes to his [her]fellow [person]
and to society, to say nothing ofmore solemn obligations,to preserve, sofar
as it lies in his [or her] own power, the inestimable gift of reason. If it is
perverted or destroyed.., on by [ones] own vices, the law holds [that
person]not accountable. But if, by voluntaryact, [one] temporarilycasts off
the restraints of reason and conscience, no wrong is done if [one] is
considered answerablefor any injury which, in that state, [one] may do to
others or to society.
Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
191. Stasio, 396 A.2d at 1134.
192. See id. at 1133; see also California v. Rocha, 479 P.2d 372, 375-76 (Cal.
1971); California v. Hood, 462 P.2d 370, 377-79 (Cal. 1969); McDaniel v. Mississippi,
356 So. 2d 1151 (Miss. 1978).
193. Rocha, 479 P.2d at 372; Hood, 462 P.2d at 370.
194. 501 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1974).
195. Id. at 518 (quoting Note, Intoxication as a CriminalDefense, supra note 6,
at 1218).
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Many judges criticize the specific intent formula as "an

unsatisfactory concept in the law," but believe it is the province of the legislature
to change.' 97 States that apply the specific intent approach effectively subsidize
intoxication to the extent they allow it to exculpate conduct in a large number of
crimes.' 98 It is a perverse twist of justice to allow one to impair one's own
mental state in order to excuse future acts. The offender, secure in the
knowledge that intoxication will mitigate an offense, enjoys the benefits of
alcoholic consumption while the victims and society absorb the harm.' 99 The
Egelhoffapproachrestrains this anomaly."'
IV. CAUSATION
The principles of causation, which determine the persons responsible for
intoxicated killings, signify the successes of recent murder convictions in various
states. The intoxicated offender's culpability lies in recklessly incurring the risk
of dangerous conduct by drinking to excess and then operating on deformed
instincts. The inebriated person is the actual, proximate, or substantial cause in
killings and injurious conduct. 20 1 "But for" the inebriation, the injurious conduct

196. A slew of offenses require specific intent: kidnapping, arson, burglary,
larceny, robbery, attempt crimes, conspiracy crimes, perjury, bribery, forgery, assault
with intent to commit great bodily harm, assault with intent to murder, assault with intent
to rape, counterfeiting, possession with intent to delivery drugs. See CLARK &
MARSHALL, supra note 138, at 148.
197. Michigan v. Langworthy, 331 N.W.2d 171, 180 (Mich. 1982).
198. Keiter, supra note 69, at 510.
199. Keiter, supra note 69, at 510.
200. A Florida senate bill's Statement of Legislative Intent, quoting Justice Scalia
nearly verbatim, demonstrates Egelhoff's influence: A prohibition on intoxication
defenses "comports with and implements society's moral perception that those who are
voluntarily impaired shall be responsible for the consequences." Gibeaut, supranote 15,
at 59. Indidna prosecutors agreed: "When we read Montana v. Egelhoffthis summer,
we saw an opportunity to make a change in Indiana law." Gibeaut, supra note 15, at 59
(quoting Marion county prosecutor Mark Massa).
201. A California Joint Legislative Committee for Revision of the Penal Code
drafted a proposed causation statute in 1968 perfectly applicable to intoxication. The
draft stated:
Sec. 408. Causation: Responsibility for Causing a Result.
(1) An element of an offense which requires that the defendant have caused
a particular result is established when his conduct is an antecedent but for
which the result would not have occurred, and,
(a) if the offense requires that the defendant intentionally or knowingly
cause the result that the actual result, as it occurred,
(1) is within the purpose or contemplation of the defendant, whether the
purpose or contemplation extends to natural events or to the conduct of
another, or, if not,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss2/3
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would not have occurred.2 2 Intoxication foreseeably endangers the drinker as
well as the public. 2 3 Physical harm is the natural and ordinary consequence of
intoxication. 2 4 Any variation between the harm foreseen and the reckless result
is not so extraordinary that it would be unfair to hold the intoxicated individual
responsible for the actual injury. °5 Causation appears particularly prophetic
with
2 6
repeated inebriated offenders who assault freely and drive recklessly.

A. Intoxication as an InchoateAct
Formerly, courts narrowly restricted the time-frame in which to view the

causation issue to the accused's state of mind at the sole moment the crime is
committed. 2 7 The courts frequently ignored the inchoate mental phase of the
preparatory intoxicated conduct before the criminal act. Yet, gross intoxication
assures tragedy long before the inebriate returns home to assault the spouse or

children and long before the inebriate turns the ignition key. The mens rea time-

(2) involves the same kind of injury or harm as that designed or
contemplated and is not too remote, accidental in its occurrence or dependent
on another's volitional act to have a just bearing on the defendant's liability
or on the gravity of his offense;
(b) if the offense requires that the defendant recklessly or negligently
cause the result, that the actual result, as it occurred,
(1) is within the risk of which the defendant was or should have been
aware, whether that risk extends to natural events or to the conduct of another,
or, if not,
(2) involves the same kind of injury or harm as that recklessly or
negligently risked and is not too remote, accidental in its occurrence or
dependent on another's volitional act to have ajust bearing on the defendant's
liability or on the gravity of his offense;
(c) if the offense imposes strict liability, that the actual result, as it
occurred, is a probable consequence of the actor's conduct.
Quoted in SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEssES 580 (6th ed. 1995).

ITS

202. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTr, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW
278 (2d ed. 1986).
203. Id.
204. See Hall, supra note 166, at 1067.
205. See Hall, supra note 166, at 1067.
206. Seattle v. Hill, 435 P.2d 692 (Wash. 1967) ("Despite [the defendant's]
claimed addiction, he had the power to make a choice. When one chooses to drink, he
must in law be deemed to have voluntarily invited the consequences of that drinking.")
(citing R.W. Gascoyne, Annotation, Modern State of the Rules as to Voluntary
Intoxication as Defense to Criminal Charge,8A.L.R.3d 1236 (1967)).
207. DRESSLER, supra note 22, at 78.
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frame must
be broadened to include the inchoate or preparatory act of abusive
208
drinking.

Intoxication may, in part, satisfy mens rea because the culpable state of
mind may be a product of imperfectly formed intent or recklessness. 2°
Drunkenness itself is not a crime, but drunkenness is an integral act that merges
with unlawful conduct into a complex act of criminal recklessness. By creating
the condition of one's own intoxication, and thereby putting oneself in such a
condition as to be no longer amendable to the law's command, the inebriate
shows 2such
recklessness that amounts to mens rea for the purpose of all
10
crimes.
The reckless indifference of abusive drinking is every bit as shocking to the
victims as an intent to kill. It is for this very reason that the common law and
modem criminal codes alike have2 1classified reckless indifferent behavior as
tantamount to intentional conduct. '

The concept of holding a person responsible for one harm because he
committed another causally connected wrong is not new to the law; indeed, it is
the foundation underlying the doctrine of felony-murder, conspiracy, and
imputed liability.212 The underlying rationale is that an actor's blameworthy

conduct in committing a lesser harm is sufficient to import the requisite element
of moral blame for the more serious offense.

208. Inchoate means "being only partly in existence; especially imperfectly formed
or formulated;" "inchoate" also denotes the "beginning of an action, state, or
occurrence." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICnONARY 580 (1975); see also DRESSLER,

supranote 22, at 77-79 ("The Issue of Time-Framing").
209. See Note, ConstructiveMurder- Drunkenness in Relation to Mens Rea, 34
HARV. L. REv. 78 (1920).

210. California v. Whitfield, 868 P.2d 272, 279 (Cal. 1994); Taylor v. Superior
Court, 598 P.2d 854, 859 (Cal. 1979) ("One who voluntarily commences, and thereafter
continues, to consume alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing from the
outset that he must thereafter operate a motor vehicle demonstrates... such a conscious
and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may be called wilful
or wanton.") (internal quotations omitted).
211. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157 (1987) ("In the common law, intentional
killing is not the only basis for establishing the most egregious form of criminal homicide
.... For example, the Model Penal Code treats reckless killing, manifesting extreme
indifference to the value of human life, as equivalent to purposeful and knowing
killing.") (internal quotations omitted); Taylor, 598 P.2d at 859.
212. The felony murder doctrine permits an offender's legal responsibility to
exceed one's intended result. Due to the increased danger posed by the dangerous
felony, the law holds a killer liable for the actual, rather than the intended crime,
committed on the policy that those who engage in dangerous felonious conduct should
be responsible for the criminal harms they have naturally, probably and foreseeably put
in motion. See Hall, supra note 166, at 1067.
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B. Intoxication as Malice Aforethought
Justice O'Connor noted during oral arguments in Egelhoff that "the
legislature perhaps could have written a [causation] law to say that a person who
acts while voluntarily intoxicated has the mental state required for a conviction
of a certain offense. '21 3 Similarly, another Justice noted during oral arguments
that "the State [could have] simply passed a statute saying, anybody who is
intoxicated and who kills another human being is guilty of first degree murder,"
'
or "[the state] could have made intoxication plus causing a death a crime."214

Such policies would comport with recognized principles of causation and
criminal liability, but would pose other problems. The problem with assigning
intoxication as an aggravatingfeature to crimes is the added burden it places on
the prosecution to prove yet another element beyond a reasonable doubt. Jurors
would debate the meaning, degree, and moral value of intoxication5
Intoxication, in and of itself, is not a crime and should have no moral stigma.2" 6
One may be intoxicated and commit a justifiable killing based on self-defense
or accident. Intoxication must not be a strict liability feature that automatically
aggravates an offense. 7 Intoxication evidence, however, may approximate
malice.'
Malice "comprehends not only a particular ill-will, but every case where
there is ... cruelty, recklessness of consequences, and a mind regardless of
social duty, although a particular person may not be intended to be injured."219
"Intoxication... so far from disproving malice, is itself a circumstance from
which malice may be implied. 220

213. Oral arg. at 4, Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996) (No. 95-566),
availablein 1996 WL 134508.

214. Oral arg. at 6, Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996) (No. 95-566),
availablein 1996 WL 134508.
215. Paulsen, supra note 13, at 13.
216. During the Prohibition era, intoxication was part of a social gospel wherein
private behaviors had to conform to the social good. Many reformers argued that "the
public interest required the legal extinction of the venal industries that plied citizens with
intoxicating drink." KERR, supra note 158, at xii.
217. Michigan v. Lardie, 551 N.W.2d 656, 667 (Mich. 1996) (holding that an
involuntary manslaughter statute which reduces the mens rea requirement is not a strict
liability offense).
218. See United States v. Fleming, 739 F.2d 945, 949 (4th Cir. 1984) (suggesting
that evidence of intoxication satisfied extreme recklessness and consequent malice), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1193 (1985)
219. Pennsylvania v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9, 15 (1868).
220. Wood v. Arkansas, 34 Ark. 341, 343 (1879) ("The intention to drink may
fully supply the place of malice aforethought."); Connecticut v. Johnson, 41 Conn. 584,
588 (1874).
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Abusive drinking varies in degree with each individual. It may be
accidental, or addictive, or short of full-blown mental impairment necessary for
the insanity defense. Causation statutes that treat intoxication as an aggravating
feature must reflect the varieties, degrees, and nuances of inebriation.22' These
evidentiary hazards would be paramount if intoxication is treated as an
aggravatingfactor in the determination of guilt.
Montana's statute, in eliminating intoxication as an excuse, recognizes that
intoxication has no superseding role in the determination of culpable guilt.
There is no collateral moral judgment regarding the status of inebriation.
Montana's statute expresses a clear and understandable principle that the abuse
of alcohol will no longer be defensible.
V. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO INTOXICATION EVIDENCE
Justice Ginsburg, in a concurring opinion in Egelhoff,noted that the unique
formation of Montana's deliberate murder statute permitted the elimination of
the intoxication defense.m "[T]he applicability of the reasonable doubt standard
... has always been dependent on how a State defines the offense that is
charged."'
Justice Ginsburg noted that if one understands Montana's
intoxication statute as redefining mens rea, then the statute suffers no
constitutional impediment.224 "States enjoy wide latitude in defining the
elements of criminal offenses, particularly when determining 'the extent to
which moral culpability should be a prerequisite to conviction of a crime."'" 5

221. Washington v. Coates, 735 P.2d 64 (Wash. 1987). In Coates,the court stated:
A person can be intoxicated and yet still be able to form the requisite mental
state, or he can be so intoxicated as to be unconscious. Under RCW
9A.16.090, it is not the fact of intoxication which is relevant, but the degree
ofintoxication and the effect it had on the defendant's ability to formulate the
requisite mental state. Thus, an instruction which requires one party or the
other to prove or disprove the fact of intoxication would be incomplete at
best.
Id. at 69.
222. 518 U.S. 37, 58-59 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). See also Hopt v. People, 104
U.S. 631 (1881). InHopt, the Court stated:
[W]hen a statute establishing different degrees of murder requires deliberate
premeditation in order to constitute murder in the first degree, the question
whether the accused in such a condition of mind, by reason of drunkenness
or otherwise, as to be capable of deliberate premeditation, necessarily
becomes a material subject of consideration by the jury.
Id. at 634.
223. Egelhoff,518 U.S. at 58 (Ginsberg, J., concurring) (quoting Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977)).
224. Id.
225. Id. See also Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225,228 (1957) ("There is wide
latitude in the lawmakers to declare an offense and to exclude elements ofknowledge and
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Montana's statute on deliberate murder, which requires reasonable awareness,
dilutes the heightened mental element of premeditation and deliberation.
Several other states have eliminated the intoxication defense by rescinding
the specific-general intent formula. In Arizona, for instance, the terms "general"
and "specific" intent were replaced by the concept of "culpable mental state"
which is comprised of intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, and with criminal
negligence. 6 States such as Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, and Hawaii have
also abandoned the specific intent distinction.227
But a state need not renunciate its specific intent formula or revise its
homicide structure in order to eliminate intoxication as a defense. Intoxication
may be eliminated in specific intent states that require first degree premeditated
murder based on historic causation and public policy theories.228 In Missouriv.
Cross, 9 for instance, the Missouri Supreme Court held that intoxication is no
defense to first degree premeditated murder:
To look for deliberation and forethought in a man maddened by

intoxication is vain, for drunkenness has deprived him of the
deliberating faculties to a greater or less extent; and if this deprivation
is to relieve him of all responsibility or to diminish it, the great
majority of crimes committed will go unpunished ....
If a man can thus divest himself of his responsibilities as a
rational creature and then perpetuate deeds of violence with a
consciousness that his actions are to be judged by the irrational

diligence from its definition."); Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Ry. Co. v. United States,
220 U.S. 559, 578 (1911) ("The power of the legislature to declare an offense, and to
exclude the elements of knowledge and due diligence from any inquiry as to its
commission, cannot, we think, be questioned.").
226. Arizona v. Ramos, 648 P.2d 119, 121 (Ariz. 1982) (holding that intoxication
could be a defense only if the crime charged requires the culpable mental state of
intentionally).
227. See White v. Arkansas, 717 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Ark. 1986) (holding that
voluntary intoxication is not a defense to criminal prosecutions); Wyant v. Delaware, 519
A.2d 649 (Del. 1986) (interpreting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 421 (1995)); Foster v.
Georgia, 374 S.E.2d 188, 194-95, 196 (Ga. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1085 (1989)
("[T]he law ...excuses the young and the insane, out of tenderness towards an infirmity
which is involuntary... [but] the law takes special care to exclude drunken men from
the excuse, because their infirmity is voluntary") (interpreting GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-4
(1998)); Hawaii v. Souza, 813 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Haw. 1991) (stating that the "legislature
was entitled to redefine the mens rea element of crimes and to exclude evidence of
voluntary intoxication to negate state of mind") (interpreting HAw. REv. STAT. § 702-230
(1993)); see also Gibeaut, supra note 15, at 62 (noting that the California General
Assembly is also considering a bill that would abandon the general-specific intent
distinction).
228. See supra notes 201-06 and accompanying text.

229. 27 Mo. 332, 338 (1858).
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condition to which he has voluntarily reduced himself, society would
not be safeY 0
Intoxication is relevant to mens rea, but voluntary intoxication is selfinduced madness, satisfying causation analysis. "So long as the offender is
capable of conceiving a design, he will be presumed, in the absence of contrary
proof, to have intended the natural consequences of his own acts."u
Several prosecutors have explored criminal liability based on the unique
statutory scheme of their state's respective homicide statutes. Intoxicated
killings in some states may constitute first or second degree murder-without
eliminating the intoxication defense.
A. IntoxicatedHomicide as FirstDegreeMurder
Recently, prosecutors inNorth Carolina and Washington successfully
prosecuted intoxicated offenders for first degree murder offenses. In North
Carolina, Thomas Jones was convicted of first degree felony-murder for causing
a fatal automobile accident, killing two persons.132 North Carolina's unique
homicide statute permits first degree felony-murder for a killing during the
commission of a felony (felonious and intoxicated driving) with the use of a
deadly weapon (the automobile). 3 Intoxication evidence aggravates, rather than
mitigates, killings. The North Carolina jury found Jones guilty of first degree
murder. The prosecutor unsuccessfully sought the death penalty against Jones,

who had a long history of intoxicated driving. The North Carolina jury instead
imposed a life sentence without parole.

230. Id. See also Kenny v. New York, 31 N.Y. 330, 337-38 (1865) (holding that
voluntary intoxication is no defense to first degree murder).
231. Kenny, 31 N.Y. at 330 ("[I]f by a voluntary act the party temporarily casts off
the restraints of reason and conscience, no wrong is done him if he is considered
answerable for any injury which in that state he may do to others or to society.") (quoting
New York v. Rodgers, 18 N.Y. 9, 18 (1858)).
232. Richard Willing & Carol J. Castaneda, A Message to ImpairedDrivers,A

North CarolinaCaseIs A Sign ofStricter Times, USA TODAY, May 7, 1997, at 1-A.
233. The North Carolina felony murder statute, Section 14-17, provides:
A murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait,
imprisonment, starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate,
and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration or
attempted perpetration of any arson, rape or a sex offense, robbery,
kidnapping, burglary, or otherfelony committed or attemptedwith the use of
a deadly weapon shall be deemed to be murderin thefirst degree,a Class A
felony, and any person who commits such murder shall be punished with
death or imprisonment in the State's prison for life without parole as the
court shall determine ....

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1993) (emphasis added).
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In the State of Washington, an intoxicated offender was convicted of first
degree murder based on the state's unique statutory scheme which punishes an
individual for recklessly exhibiting an extreme indifference to human life.' The
intoxicated offender received fifty years in prison for an automobile killing.
Washington law punishes unintentional homicides that manifest a depraved
indifference to human life the same as first degree murder, but otherwise requires
an intent to kill for a second degree murder conviction.' s
B. IntoxicatedHomicide as Second DegreeMurder
Several prosecutors charge intoxicated offenders with second degree
murder, based on reckless indifference to an unjustifiably high risk to human
life.2 6 Malice, a prerequisite for second degree murder, may be established by
evidence of conduct that is "reckless and wanton and a gross deviation from a
reasonable standard of care, of such a nature that a jury is warranted in inferring
that defendant was aware of a serious risk of death or serious bodily harm.""u7
In upholding a second degree murder conviction for intoxicated driving, the
court in United States v. Fleminge8 recognized that the Government
need only have proved that defendant intended to operate his car in the
manner in which he did with a heart that was without regard for the
life and safety of others ....In addition to being intoxicated while
driving, defendant drove in a manner that could be taken to indicate
depraved disregard of human life, particularly in light of the fact that
because he was drunk his reckless behavior was all the more
dangerous.Y39
Second degree murder based on implied malice requires that the accused act

deliberately, that the accused act with knowledge of the danger to human life,

and that the accused act in conscious disregard for human life.24

234. See Carol J. Castaneda & Paul Hoversten, War of Attrition on Drunken
Driving,USA TODAY, May 23, 1997, at 4A.
235. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.32.030(1)(a), .050(1)(b) (West 1988);
Washington v. Bowerman, 802 P.2d 116, 123 (Wash. 1990); see also ALA. CODE § 13A-

6-2 (1994) (stating that an individual is guilty of murder if he intends another person's
death, or if he recklessly exhibits an extreme indifference to human life generally).
236. See United States v Fleming, 739 F.2d 945, 947 (4th. Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1193 (1985).
237. Id. at 947-48 (quoting United States v. Black Elk, 579 F.2d 49, 51 (8th Cir.
1978)).
238. 739 F.2d at 945.
239. Id. at 948. See also California v. Watson, 637 P.2d 279, 283 (Cal. 1981).
240. California v. Whitfield, 868 P.2d 272, 278 (Cal. 1994) (affirming a second

degree murder conviction for an intoxicated driving killing).
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Moreover, in most states, second degree murder is a general intent crime to
which intoxication is no defense. As stated in New York v. Register:
[T]he only intended purpose in permitting the jury to consider
intoxication in a reckless crime is to negate defendant's awareness
and disregardofthe risk. It is precisely that point-the inconsistency
of permitting reckless and otherwise aggravating conduct to negate an
aspect of the offense-that persuades us that intoxication evidence
should be excluded whenever recklessness is an element of the offense
....
In utilitarianterms, the risk of excessive drinking should be
added to and not subtractedfrom the risks createdby the conduct of
the drunken defendantfor there is no socialorpedologicalpurpose to
be served by a rule thatpermits one who voluntarily drinks to be
exoneratedfrom failing to foresee the results of his conduct if he is
successful at getting drunk24'
Many prosecutors are eager to charge intoxicated killings as homicides when
there is prior evidence of the accused's intoxicated offenses. Prior intoxicated
acts signify subjective awareness of one's propensities to cause harm.
C. IntoxicatedHomicide Under the Model PenalCode
Some states have adopted the Model Penal Code's formula under which
intoxication is a defense to purposeful and knowing crimes, but inadmissible to
lesser reckless offenses. The drafters of the Model Penal Code replaced the
"general-specific intent" formula with a "purposeful-reckless" formula to
determine the admissibility of intoxication.242 While some states have aligned

241. New York v. Register, 457 N.E.2d 704, 709 (N.Y. 1983), cert. denied, 766
U.S. 953 (1984) (emphasis added).
242. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08.(1962), dealing with intoxication, provides:
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (4) of this Section, intoxication of the
actor is not a defense unless it negatives an element of the offense.
(2) When recklessness establishes an element of the offense, if the actor, due
to self-induced intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he would have been
aware had he been sober, such unawareness is immaterial.
(3) Intoxication does not, in itself, constitute mental disease within the
meaning of Section 4.01.
(4) Intoxication that (a) is not self-induced or (b) is pathological is an
affirmative defense if by reason of such intoxication the actor at the time of
his conduct lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate its criminality
(wrongfulness) or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
(5) Definitions. In this Section unless a different meaning plainly is required:
(a) "intoxication" means a disturbance of mental or physical capacities
resulting from the introduction of substances into the body;
(b) "self-induced intoxication" means intoxication caused by substances
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss2/3
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with the Model Penal Code, holding that intoxication can negate purpose
(sometimes called intention) and knowledge but not recklessness, 243 several
states have explicitly rejected the Model Penal Code as unworkable and contrary
to public policy. Two state jurisdictions are more restrictive than the Code,
permitting intoxication to negate a purposeful killing, but not a knowing
killing.2' One jurisdiction allows intoxication to negate recklessness.245 Other
jurisdictions allow intoxication as a defense only to first degree murder.246
Under the Code, intoxication would have been a defense in the Egelhoff
case because the Montana murder statute, like the Code, requires a purposeful
and knowing killing. To a significant extent, the Code suffers from the same
frailties as previously discussed with the specific-general intent formula.
The added problem with the Model Penal Code is that the vague line of
bifurcation between general and specific intent offenses is nearly unidentifiable
with purposeful and knowing crimes, which are lesser mental states than specific
intent. "Purposely" requires a conscious object to engage in criminal conduct. 247
"Knowingly" requires an awareness that it is highlyprobable that a result will
be caused by a person's conduct.248 Awareness and conscious design include a
broader array of offenses than the already overbloated specific intent category.
D. IntoxicatedKilling as a Distinct Offense
Nearly every state has some form of manslaughter offense known as
intoxicated homicide. These offenses are frequently too lenient. Justice [then
Judge] Levin, of the Michigan Supreme Court, in Michigan v. Kelley,249
recommended legislation defining a new crime of committing crimes under the
influence of drugs or liquor. This new crime could be graded, "depending on the

which the actor knowingly introduces into his body, the tendency of which
to cause intoxication he knows or ought to know, unless he introduces them
pursuant to medical advice or under such circumstances as would afford a
defense to a charge of crime;

(c) "pathological intoxication" means intoxication grossly excessive in
degree, given the amount of the intoxicant, to which the actor does not know
he is susceptible.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 (1962).
243.

See, e.g., New Jersey v. Cameron, 514 A.2d 1302, 1307 (N.J. 1986).

244. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.630 (Michie 1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13503 (West 1989).
245. See HAw. REV. STAT. § 702-230 (1993).
246. New Jersey v. Stasio, 396 A.2d 1129, 1136 (N.J. 1979), supercededby statute
as recognized in New Jersey v. Cameron, 514 A.2d 1302 (N.J. 1986); Pennsylvania v.
Tarver, 284 A.2d 759, 762 (Pa. 1971).
247. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2)(a) (1962).
248. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2)(b) (1962).
249. 176 N.W.2d 435 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970).
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extent and the gravity of antisocial acts previously committed in a comatose
condition, and on the antisocial conduct immediately involved., 250 Similarly,
Professor Jerome Hall has proposed a statutory distinction of the experienced
inebriate from the inexperienced inebriate." l
E. Strategiesfor the Defense
In jurisdictions that eliminate the intoxication defense, evidence of
unconsciousness produced by voluntary intoxication may be introduced when
the defense claims the accused was physically unable to accomplish the criminal
act (formerly called "prostration of the faculties").2 The defendant may use his
intoxication-induced unconsciousness to prove that he could not commit the
criminal act-the actus reus, but not to show that he committed it
involuntarily-the mens rea. James Egelhoff, for instance, argued a form of
"prostration of the faculties," but he was unsuccessful based on the evidence,
which displayed his coordinated and aggressive behavior.253
Intoxication may be a form of temporary insanity if it becomes pathological,
meaning "intoxication grossly excessive in degree, given the amount of the
intoxicant to which the person is susceptible," or "long-term intoxication that
causes permanent mental disfunction. ' '2' Habitual use of intoxicants can result

250. Id. at 444. See also Robert A. Moore, Legal Responsibility and Chronic
Alcoholism, 122 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 748, 754 (1966) (noting that Prof. Glanville
Williams "suggests a new offense of being 'drunk and dangerous' which would result in
enforced treatment" and incarceration).
251. HALL, supra note 182, at 554 n.2. See also Michigan v. Langworthy, 331
N.W.2d 171 (Mich. 1982). Judge Levin noted in dissent:
Assuming that there is justification for a defense of voluntary intoxication, a
rational legal system would allow a person who has no prior criminal history,
but loses control while intoxicated, to raise the defense, at least in mitigation,
if it allows a person who has a history ofpredatory behavior to do so.
Id. at 184 (Levin, J., dissenting).
252. See, e.g., New Jersey v. Cameron, 514 A.2d 1302, 1309 (N.J. 1986) (noting
some of the factors that determine prostration, including: "the quantity of intoxicant
consumed, the period of time involved, the actor's conduct as perceived by others... any
odor of alcohol or other intoxicating substance, the results of any tests to determine
blood-alcohol content, and the actor's ability to recall significant events"); see also
Lineham v. Florida, 442 So. 2d 244, 250 (Fla. 1983).
253. See supra notes 18-25 and accompanying text. Deliberate efforts to cover up
a crime or to eliminate evidence that identifies the accused, or deliberate actions to avoid
apprehension are evidence of a reasoning mind. See, e.g., Arizona v. Meredith, 469 P.2d
820, 823 (Ariz. 1970); Pennsylvania v. Brooks, 50 A.2d 325, 327 (Pa. 1947).
254. DRESSLER, supra note 22, at 283-84. Several cases recognize the rule that
temporary insanity caused by voluntary drug intoxication may, in particular
circumstances, constitute a valid defense. See, e.g., Twentieth Judicial Circuit v.
McNally, 336 So. 2d 713, 715-16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Illinois v. Kyse, 581 N.E.2d
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss2/3
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in permanent mental disorder even when a person is not under the immediate
influence of intoxicants. 2" If the unsoundness of mind produced by long-term
alcohol or drug abuse has become fixed or settled, the nearly universal rule is
that the defendant may assert a traditional insanity defense." 6
To succeed in an alcohol-insanity claim, the intoxication must have caused
the defendant to lack substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his or
her conduct at the time of the act or to conform his or her conduct to the
requirements of the law.25 7 The accused cannot claim pathological intoxication
8
This form of
simply because he or she is intoxicated or is even an alcoholic.
9
insanity requires a "disease of the mind" that mere drunkenness cannot satisfy.2

285, 287-88 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Jackson v. Indiana, 402 N.E.2d 947, 949 (Ind.1980);
Porreca v. Maryland, 433 A.2d 1204, 1207 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981); Michigan v.
Chapman, 418 N.W.2d 658, 659 (Mich. 1987); Michigan v. Conrad, 385 N.W.2d 277,
279 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); Minneapolis v. Altimus, 238 N.W.2d 851, 854-55 (Minn.
1976); New Hampshire v. Sadvari, 462 A.2d 102, 104 (N.H. 1983); North Carolina v.
Brown, 439 S.E.2d 589, 598 (N.C. 1994); Ohio v. Solomon 570 N.E.2d 1118, 1120
(Ohio 1991).
255. DRESSLER, supra note 22, at 245.
256. See California v. Kelly, 516 P.2d 875, 882 (Cal. 1973); Jones v. Oklahoma,
648 P.2d 1251, 1255 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982); Washington v. Wicks, 657 P.2d 781,782
(Wash. 1983). One court has rejected the defense, stating:
There is no principle basis to distinguish between the short-term and longterm effects of voluntary intoxication by punishing the first and excusing the
second. If anything, the moral blameworthiness would seem to be even
greater with respect to the long-term effects of many, repeated instances of
voluntary intoxication occurring over an extended period of time.
Bieber v. Colorado, 856 P.2d 811, 817 (Colo. 1993); see also Rucker v. Ohio, 162
N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ohio 1928) ('To constitute insanity, caused by intoxication ...it must
be insanity caused by chronic alcoholism, and not a mere temporary mental condition.").
257. See Phillip B. Hassman, Annotation, When IntoxicationDeemed Involuntary
So As to Constitute a Defense to a Criminal Charge,73 A.L.R.3d 195, 203 (1977 &
Supp. 1996) [hereinafter Hassman, When IntoxicationDeemed Involuntary].
258. See Hindman v. Missouri, 597 S.W.2d 264,268 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (holding
that terms mental disease or defect within meaning of concept of diminished
responsibility did not include alcoholism or drug abuse without psychosis); see also
Hassman, When Intoxication Deemed Involuntary, supra note 257, at 219.
259. LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 201, at 395. See also Kansas v. Seeley, 510
P.2d 115, 120 (Kan. 1973) (holding that an alcoholic cannot argue an involuntary
intoxication defense, stating that "[t]here was no evidence to show that appellant was, on
the morning in question or at any other time, irresistibly driven to take the first drink").
In Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), Justice Marshall quoted E.M. Jellinek, a
noted authority on intoxication, as follows: "Jellinek insists that conceptual clarity can
only be achieved by distinguishing carefully between 'loss of control' once an individual
has commenced to drink and 'inability to abstain' from drinking in the first place." Id.
at 524-25. Alcoholics have a compulsion to drink, but, according to all the experts, the
compulsion to take the first drink is "not completely overpowering." Id. at 525.
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In Kansas v. Seeley,2" for instance, the accused claimed that his basic
personality was altered by alcohol to such an uncontrollable extent that he
became extremely hostile and destructive.2 6' Defense experts testified that
Seeley could not control his behavior once he started drinking. Yet, the court
rejected the intoxication-insanity claim because the experts agreed that Seeley
elected, without compulsion, to take that first drink.262
Nonetheless, as more states recognize alcoholism as a disease, courts might
eventually focus on the addictive compulsion to take the first drink.263 The First
Step in Alcoholics Anonymous, regarding the foundation of recovery, requires
the alcoholic to admit and accept that he or she is powerless over thefirst drinc.
"We [must] admit we are powerless over alcohol and that our lives have become
unmanageable."'
A defense strategy must concentrate on the initial involuntariness of
intoxication, depending how involuntariness is defined. In Georgia, for example,
involuntary intoxication means "intoxication caused by (a) consumption of a
substance through excusable ignorance,or (b) the coercion, fraud, artifice, or
contrivance of another person.2 65 The definition of "excusable ignorance"
allows one to argue that unfamiliarity with the drink or its consequences is
tantamount to involuntary intoxication. The consequences of one's unusual
susceptibility to intoxication will not be a sufficient defense in most jurisdictions,
but there are rare successful cases.266
Evidence of intoxication is part of the res gestae of the offense and is
consequently admissible at trial, even in jurisdictions which ban the intoxication
excuse. 267 The accused and lay witnesses may testify to the accused's
intoxicated behavior, but the accused may not present any expert witnesses as
to the consequences of intoxication.268 Moreover, the court will instruct the jury

Even if one could claim that taking the first drink was extremely compulsive, public
policy dictates the rejection of that excuse. "A wide variety of sex offenders would be

immune from punishment if they could show that their conduct was not voluntary but
part of the pattern of a disease." Seely, 510 P.2d at 121. "[B]efore intoxication may be
said to be 'involuntary' a defendant must show an irresistible force, which is something
more than a strong urge or 'compulsion' to drink." Id.
260. 510 P.2d 115 (Kan. 1973).
261. Id. at 118-19.
262. Id. at 120.
263. See supra note 257 and accompanying text; see also Hassman, Voluntary
DrugIntoxication, supra note 21, at 130.

264. See infra note 284 and accompanying text.
265. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-4 (1996) (emphasis added).
266. See Hassman, Voluntary DrugIntoxication,supra note 21, at 128.
267. If the accused would testify about the accused's own intoxication, the court

would probably issue a cautionary instruction that intoxication is no excuse or no
defense. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996).
268. See, e.g., Wyant v. Delaware, 519 A.2d 649, 658 (Del. 1986).
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that intoxication is no defense and no excuse for the crime. A defense attorney
might employ subtle strategies ofjury nullification269 or mistake of fact (in cases
of provocation). 270 A crafty defense attorney might juxtapose a "prostration of
mistake of fact. Physical
the faculties" theory with a bona fide claim27of
1
incapacitation affects the perception of reality.
When the excuse of intoxication is excised from a case, the defense may
nevertheless employ the underlying defense or justification for the harm caused,
such as self-defense, accident, necessity, or provocation. If, for instance, an
intoxicated person passes counterfeit money, he or she can defend the claim
based on accident or mistake.
Finally, the defense attorney might propose that intoxication should mitigate
the sentence, especially with first time offenders. 72 Many jurisdictions have

269. For example, blaming society or others for entrapping one into drinking. The
defense might entertain an 'excuse that the accused is morally blameless because the
accused possessed substantially less free choice than the normal person under the
circumstances. Under jury nullification, the jury has the power to enter an acquittal
contrary to the law and to the court's instructions. See United States v. Dougherty, 473
F.2d 1113, 1130-37 (D.C. Cir. 1972). While the jury is not instructed on this power and
is specifically told that the case must be based, not on sympathy, but on the evidence and
the court's instructions, the jury can simply refuse to enforce a law of which it
disapproves.
270. Dressler describes the mistake of fact defense as follows:
A person's misperception of reality, even when not caused by insanity,
intoxication, or some other special factor, sometimes exculpates him for the
harm that he causes. Perhaps a better way to understand why a mistake of
fact may exculpate an actor is to observe that what makes a person's mistaken
action "involuntary" has more to do with his cognition (what he is aware of)
than with his volition (his capacity to control his conduct). From this
realization, as one scholar has observed, "the trail leads plainly to mens rea."
DRESSLER, supra note 22, at 128.
271. See Gibeaut, supra note 15, at 60 (arguing a hybrid defense incorporating
elements of voluntary and involuntary intoxication in Arizona, which prohibits acute
intoxication as a defense).
272. Under one sentencing proposal by an English legislative committee, anyone
who causes the harm proscribed by a "listed offense" while deliberately intoxicated
should be guilty of criminal intoxication. The listed offenses are those which cause
substantial harm to person, public order, or the physical safety of property. To be
culpable, the defendant must have voluntarily taken a substance, knowing that the
quantity taken might substantially impair one's awareness, understanding, or control.
The suggested punishment for criminal intoxication is based on the underlying offense:
two-thirds of the possible sentence, with a maximum of ten years imprisonment for
nonhomicide offenses. Linking the punishment to the harm caused makes sense given
that defendant's culpability is based on self-induced intoxication. KADISH &
SCHULHOFER, supra note 201, at 928-29. See also St. Pe v. Texas, 495 S.W.2d 224 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1973); Kelly v. Texas, 442 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
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adopted deferment programs for drug offenders, and some jurisdictions have
adopted unique rehabilitation opportunities for offenders in less severe cases.
VI. CONCLUSION

Drinking transcends responsibilities, provides an escape from everyday
pressures, and relieves social constraints and personal inhibitions.27 a "In small
amounts, alcohol induces feelings of happiness and lightness, depending on the
personality, mood, and expectations of the drinker. As the drinking continues,
drowsiness, belligerence, extreme boisterousness, or depression may occur along
'
with physiological discomfort."274
Excessive drinking may trigger a coma and
275
death. For many persons, drinking becomes an obsession that slices through
life's affectations and reduces everything to basic naked aggression.
Yet despite its dangers, alcohol use is an historical phenomenon dating back
to the Stone Age.276 The first known brewery appeared about 3700 B.C. in
Egypt.277 In Greek civilization, wine was a custom. Greek social gatherings
were called symposia- "drinking together., 278 In the seventeenth century,
Europeans introduced alcohol to the North American Indians. The borough of

273. According to historian Dr. Joel Fort, the Arabs introduced distilled forms of
alcohol into Europe around the tenth century as a medicine until it became plentiful and
inexpensive and its use was extended. The Arabs are responsible for the name "alcohol."
The European alchemists used distilled alcohol as an antidote for senility and called it
Aqua Vitae, the water of life. In many societies a drop of whiskey or wine is occasionally
recommended for older people to mildly stimulate their hearts. FORT, supra note 4, at
44-50.
274. FORT, supra note 4, at 24.
275. In Orland Park, Illinois, 16 year-old Elizabeth Wakulich died after drinking
a quart of 107 proof schnapps. She had a blood-alcohol level of .38, nearly four times
the legal limit, some 12 hours after drinking the liquor. See Tamara Kerrill, Girl Dies
Over DrinkingBet, CHI. SuN-TIMEs, June 18, 1997, at A9. Recently, several college
students have died from alcoholic binge drinking. 375 people ages 15 to 24 died from
alcohol poisoning in 1994, according to the National Center for Health Statistics. See
Martha T. Moore, Binge DrinkingStalks Campuses, The Death of.An 18 Year Old MIT
Student is a Somber Reminder to Colleges: The 'Culture ofDrinking' is a Formidable

Enemy in the WarAgainstAlcohol Abuse, USA TODAY, Oct. 1, 1997, at 3A. In August,
1997, student Benjamin Wynne from Louisiana State University, died of alcohol binge
drinking. Id. In September, 1997, student Scott Krueger died from alcoholic binge
drinking at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Id.
276. FORT, supranote 4, at 44 (noting that beer jugs were found dating to the Stone
Age).

277. The Egyptians attributed intoxicants to Osiris, their Creator. They also
promulgated the first known temperance tract some 3,000 years ago. See FORT, supra
note 4, at 44.
278. FORT, supra note 4, at 44.
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name Manahachtanienk, which means
Manhattan originated from an Indian
279
drunk.'
got
all
we
where
"place
Resoundingly, Americans have rejected complete prohibition of alcohol.
The "Wets," pro-drinkers, and "Drys," anti-drinkers, debated alcohol prohibition
with several states' admission into the Union. 280 The Prohibition era created
of overstrict laws barring alcohol,
racketeers and revealed the societal hazards
28
culminating in the 21 st Amendment. '
Nearly every culture has sanctioned some alcohol use for social, religious,
or political occasions. 282 There is growing evidence that moderate drinking is
beneficial to one's health, protecting against coronary diseases. 283 Additionally,
the alcohol industry employs a wide segment of American citizens with
considerable political clout: grain farmers, vineyard owners, glass blowers, truck

drivers, bartenders, waitresses, warehousemen, salespeople, advertising agencies,
brewers, lobbyists, politicians, businessmen, restaurant owners, and consumers.
Since alcohol permeates American society so seductively, abusive drinking is
inevitable.
Nonetheless, there are a variety of health measures, employment benefits,
and preventative programs to stem the tide of abuses. 284 Many states are
279. FORT, supra note 4, at 49.
280. KERR, supra note 158, at 160-84.
281. See KERR, supra note 158, at 185-210. The 21st Amendment states: "The

eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby
repealed." U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. The 18th Amendment states: "After one year
from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating
liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United
States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby
prohibited." U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII.
282. See FORT, supra note 4, at 43-63.

283. Few doctors recommend one drink as medicinal because of alcohol's
addictive qualities. Moreover, this statement facilitates a persons's addictive response.
284. See Note, Alcohol Abuse and the Law, supra note 10, at 1696 ("Congress

should adopt broader policies promoting rapid establishment of occupational alcoholism
programs in private workplaces."). For serious addictive alcoholics, as well as other
general addictions, Alcoholics Anonymous is famous for its recovery plan with the 12
Step approach. Unlike most self-help programs, the 12 Steps provide an unusual course
for addictive recovery. See HAZELDEN FOUNDATION, THE TwELVE STEPS OF ALCOHOLICS
ANONYMOUS (1993).

The first step begins with an awkward admission of

"powerlessness" over one's compulsive addictions. The 12 Steps hurt.., and heal:

Step One: "[We] admitted we were powerless over alcohol-that our lives had
become unmanageable."

This is the foundation of the Steps and perhaps the most difficult. Admitting
powerlessness. Yet, understanding powerlessness is essential in helping us overcome the
moral implications and social stigma that alcoholics are bad people. We are powerless
over alcohol as we are with any disease.

Step Two: "[We] Came to believe that a Power greater than ourselves could
restoreus to sanity."
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There is a promise of hope. Because there are no cures for alcoholism, only
ongoing recovery one day at a time will work. Irrespective of length of sobriety... The
"Power" referred to in Step two is not necessarily God. "There is hope for us if we come
to believe that the source of power we need in our recovery lies outside ourselves." Id.
at 19. Many would say it is God, others would say it is "the Program." (the 12 Steps, the
Big Book, and meeting attendance and fellowship.)
Step three: "[We] made a decision to turn our will and our lives over to the care
of God as we understoodHim. "
This step "simply assumes there is a God to understand and that we each have a
God ofour own understanding." Id. at 23. "Until now, we have allowed fears of failure,
of honest expression, and of rejection to govern and direct our lives." Id. at 24. Total
abstinence comes first. Id. at 27. Then salvation.

Stepfour: "[We] made a searchingandfearless moral inventory of ourselves."
"It takes courage to face yourself and what has really been going on in your life."
Id. at 28. We must admit our mistakes. We are evolving towards a state of selfawareness and self-acceptance. "Those of us taking the Fourth Step for the first time will
perhaps want to go as far back as early childhood to uncover resentful feelings and the
persons and events associated with them." Id.at 61. One must look at specific instances.
"Thoroughness demands a willingness to get specific, to name concretely what happened.
.." Id. at 62. One must focus not only on one's liabilities and defects, but also on one's
assets.
Stepfive: "[We] admittedto God, to ourselves, and to anotherhuman being, the
exact natureof our wrongs. "
Admitting to another the exact nature of one's wrongs leads some into a new
harmony and release from feelings of guilt. Others have experienced dejection,
disappointment, and exhaustion. This is an important step towards spiritual progress, not
spiritual perfection. The listener must share in their own defect and engage in a dialogue,
especially in matters that we would consciously prefer not to share. People must tell the
stories of their lives. Many employ a "sponsor."
Steps Six and Seven: "[We] were entirely ready to have God remove all these
defects of character.Humbly asked Him to remove our shortcomings."
Recovery is a spiritual, physical, and mental process. We can identify our character
defects, accept them, and gain some measure of strength to manage them. We can use
time for quiet contemplation and internalize the knowledge and certainty that we are not
alone anymore.
Step Eight: "[We] made a list of allpersons we had harmed, and became willing
to make amends to them all."
This is an inventory step. The most effective means of overcoming resentment is
forgiveness, of ourselves and of others.
Step Nine: "[We] made direct amends to such people whereverpossible, except
when to do so would injure them or others."
This is an action step. We have to reconstruct some of the damaged relationships.
Step Ten: "[We] continued to take personalinventory and when we were wrong
promptly admitted it. "
There are times when we all need another person in order to take a good inventory.
This Step strengthens and protects one's sobriety.
Step Eleven: "[We] sought prayer and meditation to improve our conscious
contact with God as we understoodHim, praying onlyfor knowledge ofHis willfor us
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss2/3
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considering suing the alcohol industry for health benefits. "First, the states sued
the tobacco companies and recovered hundreds of billions of dollars in smoking
related Medicaid costs."' ns Now, cities and states are preparing a number of suits
against the gun industry and even the alcohol industry.286
For the most part, people who drink are not alcoholics and are able to
exercise self-restraint.287 A large proportion of alcoholics conceal their drinking

and the power to carrythat out."
This is really Steps Two and Three practiced on a daily basis.
Step Twelve: "Havinghad a spiritualawakening as the result of these steps, we
tried to carry this message to alcoholics and to practice these principles in all our
affairs."
"Carrying the message" means that we reach out to other alcoholics or chemically
dependent people and share with them the "language of our hearts." Step Twelve
requires visiting other individuals who are perceived as needing help.
285. Fox Butterfield, Results in Tobacco Litigation Spur Cities to File Gun Suits,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1998, at Al. As with the tobacco litigation, the entire public is
burdened by the costs resulting from use of a dangerous product.
286. Fox Butterfield, To Rejuvenate Gun Sales, Critics Say, Industry Started
Making More PowerfulPistols,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1999, at 16. Cities have sued gun
manufacturers on two unique theories: First, enhancing the lethality of guns without
incorporating sound safety devices; second, negligent distribution by "oversupplying
stores in southern states that have lax gun laws, knowing that some of the guns would be
bought by people in New York City who would resell them to criminals and juveniles."
Id.
287. See Sally L. Satel, Don't Forgetthe Addict's Role in Addiction, N.Y. TIMES,
April 4, 1998, at A23. In countering the assertion that addiction is a brain disease, Ms.
Satel, a psychiatrist at a methadone clinic, writes:
What is really misleading about the... assertion that "addiction is primarily
a brain disease"-it omits the voluntary aspects ofan addicts's behavior.
Addicts' brains are not always in a state of siege. Many addicts have
episodes of clean time that last for weeks, months or years. During these
periods it is the individuals's responsibility to make himself less vulnerable
to drug craving and relapse.
Treatment can help the addict learn how to fight urges and find
alternative ways to meet emotional and spiritual needs. But will he take the
advice? Maybe. More likely, he will begin a revolving-door dance with the
treatment system.
Drug addicts and alcoholics respond to rewards and consequences, not
just to physiology. Relapse should not be regarded as an inevitable,
involuntary product of a diseased brain.... Turning addiction into a medical
problem serves a purpose, of course. The idea is to reduce stigma and get
better financing and more insurance coverage for treatment .... But when
the National Institute [on Drug Abuse] says that addiction is just like diabetes
or asthma, it has the equation backward. A diabetic or asthmatic who relapses
because he ignores his doctor's advice is more like an addict, as his relapses
result from forsaking the behavioral regimens that he knows can keep him
clean.
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problem, and their intricate acts of concealment indicate personal choice.28 The
psychological studies on the effect of alcohol on an individual's personality
suggest that the drinker usually intends his or her actions just as purposely as
those of a sober person. "To be sure, the inebriate may not 'intend' his [or her]
actions in the sense that he [or she] is not in full control of himself. Yet such a
notion of intent would sweep too far, for a person who is fatigued, emotionally
upset, or simply short-tempered is also not in full control of himself."289
According to many reports, the abusive drinker maintains intent, but lacks
ethical sensitivity. Alcohol must be treated as a dangerous instrument, requiring
a heightened state of awareness. "Inebriates are as responsible for subsequent
harm as if they unleashed a dangerous animal upon defenseless victims. One
who releases a pit bull into a room of helpless infants is responsible not because
he controlled the animal's actions in killing a child, but because he voluntarily
forfeited his control over the dog. A similar rationale applies to inebriates."29
When a person voluntarily arouses the drunkenness to which he or she is
predisposed and commits a crime, then that person has blinded their moral
perceptions to release their individual demons. 9 ' The Montana legislature

The message that addiction is chronic and relapse inevitable is
demoralizing to patients and gives the treatment system an excuse if it doesn't
serve them well. Callingaddiction a behavioralcondition ... emphasizes
that the person, not his autonomous brain, is the instigator of his relapse and
the agent of his recovery. This [position] does not deny the existence of
vulnerabilities, biological or otherwise. Instead it makes the struggle to
relinquish drugs all the more enobling.

Id.
288. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 530 (1968) (noting that there are an estimated
4,000,000 alcoholics in America, and this figure is considerably higher when the closet
alcoholics are considered). See also Arizona v. Meredith, 469 P.2d 820 (Ariz. 1970);
Pennsylvania v. Brooks, 50 A.2d 325 (Pa. 1947).
289. Note, Intoxication as a CriminalDefense, supra note 6, at 1217. See also
Arizona v. Ramos, 648 P.2d 119, 122 (Ariz. 1982) ("If one trusts in the adage in vino
veritas the law allows conviction of those whose acts while intoxicated have exposed
their true nature."); Note, AlcoholAbuse and the Law, supra note 10, at 1686 ("Alcohol
dampens inhibitions, but it does not generally impair the ability to act purposely.").
290. Keiter, supra note 69, at 499. See also Roberts v. Michigan, 19 Mich. 385
(1870). In Roberts, the court stated:
He must be held to have purposely blinded his moral perceptions, and set his
will free from the control of reasons-to have suppressed the guards and
invited the mutiny; and should therefore be held responsible as well for the
vicious excesses of the will, thus set free, as for the acts done by its
prompting.
Id. at 418. See also Paulsen, supranote 13, at 5 ("Through a choice, of the sort normally
operative in the law, the inebriate has increased the risk of harm to others by reducing his
own capacity for taking dangers into account and for controlling himself. If would be
incongruous if an election of that sort would exculpate.").
291. See New York v. Register, 457 N.E.2d 704 (N.Y. 1983), cert. denied, 466
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declared that it is fundamentally fair to hold people criminally liable for the harm
they cause while in a drunken stupor. Studies reveal that nondrinkers are
seventy percent more likely to be killed or harmed in households where
alcoholism exists. 292 Self-contracted madness induced by alcohol prophetically
results in crime. Since early American law, the general public has been aware
that intoxication and criminal misconduct are inextricably related.
There is a principle that nothing in common law is ever lost-that every
precedent exists somewhere in space and time to be resurrected. By stating that
"an intoxicated condition may not be taken into consideration in determining the
existence of a mental state which is an element of the offense," the Montana
legislature effectively resurrected a fundamental principle of yesteryear. By
means of this provision, the Montana legislature excised the entire subject of
self-induced intoxication from the mens rea inquiry, based on the legislature's
empirical view that criminal responsibility is not lessened by self-induced
intoxication. The doctrine of mens rea has "historically provided the tools for
a constantly shifting adjustment of the tension between the evolving aims of the
criminal law and changing religious, moral, philosophical, and medical views of
the nature of man. This process of adjustment has always been thought to be the
province of the States."2'93 Egelhoffreconfirmed that the states are free to alter
the substantive definitions of crimes, defenses, and relevancy, even if by doing
so they make prosecution easier.

U.S. 953 (1984). In Register, the court stated:
The common law courts viewed the decision to drink to excess, with its

attendant risks to self and others, as an independent culpable act .... In
utilitarian terms, the risk of excessive drinking should be added to and not
subtracted from the risks created by the conduct of the drunken defendant for
there is no social or penological purpose to be served by a rule that permits
one who voluntarily drinks to be exonerated from failing to foresee the results
of his conduct if he is successful at getting drunk.
Id. at 709. See also Keenan v. Commonwealth, 44 Pa. 56, 58 (1862) ("No one pretends
that intoxication is, of itself, an excuse or palliation of a crime. If it were, all crimes
would, in a great measure, depend for the criminality on the pleasure of their perpetrators,
since they may pass into that state when they will.").
As an analogy, when one knows one is subject to epileptic seizures while driving,
then that person may be held criminally liable. See New York v. Decina, 138 N.E.2d 799
(N.Y. 1956).
292. The entire alcoholic and drug climate increases the risk of harm and death to
third persons. The link between violence and drug and alcohol abuse may result from
the drug seeking activities, such as interaction with drug dealers and theft to obtain
resources for drug purchases. See Saying 'No' to Drugs But Dying in Violence,
Substance Abuse in Home is a Risk Factor,WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 1997, at All
(reporting on a study published in the Journal of the American Medical Association
released on August 20, 1997).
293. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536 (1968).
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The pronounced difference between Montana's approach and the
intemperance movement of the earlier Prohibition era is that Montana places no
moral judgment on drinking. Under Montana's approach, intoxication is not an
aggravatingfactor with collateral moral consequences; intoxication is simply
eliminated from the mens rea equation. "The law's sympathy belongs not with
an individual who consumes a stupefying amount of intoxicants and shoots two
innocent people in the head, but with the victims of such slaughter." 294 Despite
the historical concessions to alcohol within the American way of life, there must
be personal accountability. Few can stand against Montana's simple imperative
that self-induced intoxication offers no excuse to destroy life.

294. Keiter, supranote 69, at 517. See also Kennan v. Commonwealth, 44 Pa. 56,
59 (1862). In Keenan, the court stated:
Men [and women] who degrade themselves below the ordinary level of social
morality, by bad conduct or habits, do not thereby relieve themselves from

having their acts and duties judged by the ordinary rules of social action.
They cannot set up their own vices as a reason for being set into a special
class that is to be judged more favorably than other persons.

Id. at 59.
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